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# The 2000 FIU Cuba Poll

Guillermo J. Grenier  
*Florida International University*

Hugh Gladwin  
*Florida International University*

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# 2000 FIU/Cuba Poll

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Cuban Research Institute  
Institute for Public Opinion Research  
Center for Labor Research and Studies**

**Florida International University**

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**Guillermo Grenier  
Hugh Gladwin**

<http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/ipor/cuba2000/>

### General Findings

The Cuban American residents of Miami-Dade County are generally concerned about the lack of change on the island but they are far from monolithic in their support for different policies. There are major differences of opinion and a number of these vary systematically across different groups in the community.

There appears to be an increasing frustration about the lack of political change occurring on the island and the growing realization that desired changes are not likely to occur anytime soon. Only 10.3% of the Cuban American respondents feel that changes will occur within one year. (9.1% local non-Cuban and 3.5% National). An additional 33.3% percent anticipate that major changes are more than one year but less than five years away. (37.5% local non-Cuban and 35.3% National). At the same time, 28.2% stated that change would never come to the island (17.9% local non-Cuban, 42.1% National.)

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll. Five times since 1991 FIU researchers from the Center for Labor Research and Studies, the Institute of Public Opinion Research and the Cuban Research Institute have developed a detailed methodology for measuring the political attitudes of the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County. The poll is specifically designed to measure the attitudes of the Cuban-American community towards US/Cuba policy and how these attitudes have an impact on Greater Miami. This year, thanks to the funding by the Christopher Reynolds Foundation and the university's Office of the President., the poll was expanded to include a local, non-Cuban sample as well as a national sample.

The first Cuba Poll was conducted 10 years ago, in March of 1991. Subsequent polls were conducted in October of 1991, in June of 1993 and March of 1995 and July of 1997. As in the four previous polls, the researchers this year found a diversity of opinions on what policies would facilitate political changes on the island. The consistency of some of the responses, as well as the shift in others, present us with the most complete picture to date of the Cuban-American political attitudes towards Cuba. While most of the responses were consistent with the previous surveys, no poll is without surprises. Some long standing attitudes seem to have changed, while some new events have generated diverse responses from Cuban-Americans as well as the non-Cubans and national communities. Of particular interest in this poll was to take the pulse of the Greater Miami region six months after the Elian Gonzalez controversy. This brief summary presents selected findings from the 2000 Cuba Poll.

### General Findings

The Cuban American residents of Miami-Dade County are generally concerned about the lack of change on the island but they are far from monolithic in their support for different policies. There are major differences of opinion and a number of these vary systematically across different groups in the community.

- There appears to be an increasing frustration about the lack of political change occurring on the island and the growing realization that desired changes are not likely to occur anytime soon. Only 10.3% of the Cuban-American respondents feel that changes will occur within one year. **(9.1% local non-Cuban and 3.5% National)**. An additional 33.3% percent anticipate that major changes are more than one year but less than five years away. **(37.5% local non-Cuban and 35.3% National)** At the same time, 28.2% stated that change would never come to the island **(17.9% local non-Cuban, 12.1% National.)**

- Over fifty one percent of the Cuban respondents signal that they would support a dialogue with the Cuban government. In the context of the other responses, this desire can be interpreted as signifying that among some within the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County, a dialogue is seen as an agent of positive change. ( **78.6% local non-Cuban and 80.2 National** )

- Although only 25.8% feel that the embargo has worked well, ( **16.9% local non-Cuban and 34.2% National** ) the Cuban American population expressed strong support for its continuation 64.2%. ( **39.1% local non-Cuban and 42.6% national** ).

- When asked about the specific restrictions imposed by the embargo, the respondents show a somewhat more moderate side. Approximately over 48% of the respondents support the prohibition on U.S. companies from doing business in Cuba. ( **38.2% local non-Cuban and 34.8% National** ). At the same time, approximately 66% would favor allowing companies to sell medicine to the people on the island. ( **88.4% local non-Cuban and 89.8% National** ) and 56% would favor the sale of food ( **83% local non-Cuban, 86.3% National** ).

- Echoing the results of the other surveys, the Cuban-American community is willing to lend support to human rights groups working inside Cuba. Over 94.5% of respondents support lending a hand to such groups. ( **92.4% local non-Cuban and 83.5% National** )

- There continues to be support for military action by exile groups 69.6% ( **45.3% local non-Cuban and 21.8% National** ) as well as a U.S. invasion of the island 61%. ( **39.9% local non-Cuban and 17.9% National** )

- A large majority 78.9% feels that all points of view on how to deal with Castro are not being heard in Miami. ( **67.5% local non-Cuban** ). Cubans feel that the opinions supporting stronger opposition are not being heard ( **48%** ) whereas a similar number of non-Cubans in the area believe that the views supporting more open relations are not being heard ( **45%** ).

- Nearly 80.5% of the respondents feel that the number of visas currently being given to Cubans on the island to come to the United States to live is appropriate. ( **52.8% local non-Cuban and 54.9% National** )

- Approximately 54% of Cuban-Americans believe that Cubans leave the island primarily to seek political freedom while 26% think that the motivations are primarily economic in nature. About 39% of the non-Cuban locals believe that lack of freedom drives the exodus while 42% point to economic issues. Falling in between these two groups are the national respondents, 33% of whom respondents highlight economic reasons while 45% say that lack of freedom drives those fleeing.

- A large majority of respondents 77.9% report that a political candidate's position on Cuba is important in determining their vote. ( **62.3% local non-Cuban and 46.6% National** )

- 22.6% percent would be very likely and 17.5% somewhat likely to return to live on the island if the country's government changed to a democratic form.

## ON THE CASE OF ELIAN GONZALEZ

Few events in the long history of the Cuban-Americans in the United States have mobilized the community as did the plight of Elian Gonzalez. While this and other studies of the Cuban-American community show that there is a broad diversity within the population on most issues, seldom has the community behaved as monolithically as it did in its attempt to influence the outcome of the Elian case. The numbers clearly show the different perspectives held by the local non-Cuban community as well as the national sample.

- 78.5 % of Cuban-Americans believed that Elian should have stayed in the United States. This opinion was held by only 33.6% of local non-Cubans and 28.3% of national respondents.
- Over 62% of the Cuban-Americans felt that the local media presented the issues in the Elian case in a fair and objective manner while 53% of non-Cubans held this opinion. The difference among the samples is greater when the question deals with the national coverage of the Elian case. Only 40% of Cubans felt that the national media covered the case fairly and objectively while 65% of local non-Cubans and 51% of national respondents had a positive view of media coverage.
- When asked whether the interests of the Cuban-American community were helped or hurt by the Elian affair, all samples agreed with overwhelming certitude that the case had hurt the Cuban-American community. (Cubans: 82%, Local non-Cubans 80.4%, National 84.6%).
- On the theme of ethnic relations, most Cubans and local non-Cubans felt that relations between the ethnic groups after the Elian affair were about the same as they were before Elian came and went. Nearly 60% of Cubans and 54 % of local non-Cubans felt that relations had not changed. While 31% of Cubans and 37% of non-Cubans felt that they had worsen.

## OTHER OPINIONS

As always, the poll serves to support or debunk many of the views held about the Cuban-American community. There were no surprises associated with the electoral preferences of the community. About 72.8% percent of the respondents are U.S. citizens. Of these, 90.2 percent report being registered to vote. And of these, 67.1 percent are registered in the Republican Party, 17.2 percent are registered Democrats and 14.1 percent are Independents.

- In the upcoming Presidential election, 64 percent are expecting to vote for George W. Bush and 15 percent will cast their ballot for Al Gore. This signals another division with the local non-Cuban population which indicated a significant support for Gore (49% to 21% for Bush.) The national sample was fairly evenly divided, with 36% favoring Gore and 28% leaning towards Bush, but with an impressive 30% declaring themselves to be undecided.
- While most Cubans believe that the next president of Cuba should be someone currently living on the island (48%) as opposed to someone now living in exile (27%), a large percentage feel that some local politicians will play a major role in Cuba when a transition occurs (65%). Most of the respondents felt that Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart would be the local politician to play the most significant role in Cuba's future (42%).
- Contradicting the popular view of a monolithically intolerant community, most Cubans (54.7%) disagreed with the idea that musical groups that come from Cuba, such as Los Van Van, should not be allowed to perform in Miami. While this number is much lower than the 85% of the local non-Cuban sample that reject this policy of exclusion, it is still a surprisingly high number. Similarly, 52% of Cubans disagreed with the recently repealed County ordinance which prevented the use of County funds to be used for events that include artists from Cuba. An overwhelming 75.5% of non-Cubans disagreed with the now defunct policy.

## METHODOLOGY (PRELIMINARY NOTES)

From September 20 to October 17, 1,975 people were interviewed about their support of policies toward Cuba. Three samples were interviewed: a sample of 1,975 Miami-Dade County residents of Cuban descent, 400 non-Cuban residents of the same county, and a national of 400 U.S. residents.

Each was a random sample generated from telephone exchanges using standard random-digit-dialing procedures that ensure that each residential phone has an equal chance of being chosen for the sample. Bilingual (Spanish/English) interviewers conducted the

interviews from IPOR'S telephone lab at the Biscayne Bay Campus of Florida International University. The margin of error for the Cuban sample of 1,975 is +/- 3% at the 95% confidence level. The margin of error for the two other samples is +/- 5%.

About half of the Cuban sample were people who came to the United States from Cuba before 1975. 14% (227) arrived in the years 1959-1964. Results for this group have a margin of error of +/- 7%. Other groups by years arrived in the US are: 278 in 1965-1974 (+/- 6%), 167 in 1975-1984 (+/- 8%), and 239 arrived after 1984 (+/- 6%). 150 respondents were born in the U.S. (+/- 8%). These margins of error are precise enough to make many of the differences in opinion between these groups statistically significant.

|               | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | Nonlocal |
|---------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Within 1 year | 8.7%        | 5.1%            | 8.3%     |
| 1 to 5 years  | 25.1%       | 24.8%           | 25.7%    |
| 6 to 10 years | 15.8%       | 15.0%           | 17.1%    |
| over 10 years | 50.7%       | 50.7%           | 47.9%    |
| Never         | 28.3%       | 11.2%           | 12.1%    |
| Don't know    | 2.5%        | 2.7%            | 3.7%     |

## PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS

Dr. Guillermo J. Grenier is Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology and Director of the Center for Labor Research and Studies at Florida International University. Dr. Hugh Gladwin is Director of the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IPOR) at FIU and Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology. .



## Question number 1

Over the past few years, people have been talking about the possibility of political changes in Cuba. When do you think that major political changes are likely to occur in Cuba? Would you say within one year, in two to five years, in six to ten years, over ten years, or never?

|                  | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Within 1 year    | 9.7%        | 9.1%            | 3.5%     |
| in 2 to 5 years  | 33.1%       | 37.5%           | 35.3%    |
| in 6 to 10 years | 11.8%       | 15.6%           | 27.9%    |
| over ten years   | 14.7%       | 16.6%           | 17.9%    |
| never            | 28.2%       | 17.9%           | 12.1%    |
| Don't care       | 2.5%        | 3.3%            | 3.2%     |

## Question number 2

First, allow companies to sell medicine to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Strongly Favor  | 44.3%       | 59.5%           | 38.4%    |
| Mostly Favor    | 21.8%       | 28.9%           | 51.4%    |
| Mostly Oppose   | 6.6%        | 3.6%            | 4.7%     |
| Strongly Oppose | 27.4%       | 8.0%            | 5.5%     |



### Question number 3

Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Strongly Favor  | 38.4%       | 56.9%           | 39.7%    |
| Mostly Favor    | 17.9%       | 26.2%           | 46.6%    |
| Mostly Oppose   | 8.9%        | 6.8%            | 7.0%     |
| Strongly Oppose | 34.8%       | 10.1%           | 6.7%     |

### Question number 4

Supporting direct U.S. military action to overthrow the Cuban government. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Strongly Favor  | 49.4%       | 26.0%           | 8.1%     |
| Mostly Favor    | 11.0%       | 13.9%           | 9.8%     |
| Mostly Oppose   | 10.0%       | 16.1%           | 29.0%    |
| Strongly Oppose | 29.6%       | 44.0%           | 53.1%    |

## Question number 5

Supporting military action by the exile community to overthrow the Cuban Government. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Strongly Favor  | 55.5%       | 27.6%           | 5.8%     |
| Mostly Favor    | 13.5%       | 17.7%           | 16.0%    |
| Mostly Oppose   | 9.6%        | 18.2%           | 29.9%    |
| Strongly Oppose | 21.4%       | 36.5%           | 48.3%    |

## Question number 6

Supporting human rights groups inside Cuba. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Strongly Favor  | 79.9%       | 66.5%           | 43.6%    |
| Mostly Favor    | 14.7%       | 25.9%           | 39.9%    |
| Mostly Oppose   | 1.9%        | 2.6%            | 11.2%    |
| Strongly Oppose | 3.5%        | 5.0%            | 5.3%     |

## Question number 7

Establishing a national dialogue among Cuban exiles, Cuban dissidents, and representatives of the Cuban government. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Strongly Favor  | 34.4%       | 49.0%           | 29.3%    |
| Mostly Favor    | 17.2%       | 29.6%           | 50.9%    |
| Mostly Oppose   | 11.8%       | 8.7%            | 12.0%    |
| Strongly Oppose | 36.6%       | 12.8%           | 7.8%     |

## Question number 8

Prohibiting U.S. companies from doing business with Cuba. Do you Strongly approve, mostly approve, mostly disapprove, or strongly disapprove?

|                     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Strongly Approve    | 37.1%       | 23.5%           | 12.4%    |
| Mostly Approve      | 10.5%       | 14.7%           | 22.4%    |
| Mostly Disapprove   | 12.3%       | 14.8%           | 33.2%    |
| Strongly Disapprove | 40.1%       | 37.1%           | 31.9%    |

## Question number 9

Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not at all?

|               | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|---------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Very Well     | 8.4%        | 4.5%            | 3.7%     |
| Well          | 17.3%       | 13.4%           | 30.5%    |
| Not Very Well | 33.4%       | 42.9%           | 44.0%    |
| Not At All    | 40.9%       | 39.2%           | 21.8%    |

## Question number 10

Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba?

|        | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|--------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Favor  | 62.4%       | 39.1%           | 42.6%    |
| Oppose | 37.6%       | 60.9%           | 57.4%    |

## Question number 11

Immediately after Fidel and Raul Castro leave power, do you think the United States should be very involved in what happens politically in Cuba, somewhat involved, or not involved at all?

|                     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Very involved       | 44.9%       | 26.6%           | 19.8%    |
| Somewhat involved   | 33.5%       | 38.9%           | 50.7%    |
| Not involved at all | 21.6%       | 34.5%           | 29.5%    |

## Question number 12

Immediately after Fidel and Raul Castro leave power, which do you think would be better: that the next president of Cuba be someone now living in Cuba, or be someone from the exile community?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Someone in Cuba | 48.0%       | 57.6%           | 60.2%    |
| Exile Community | 26.6%       | 28.8%           | 21.5%    |
| Either          | 23.2%       | 9.8%            | 16.6%    |
| Neither         | 2.3%        | 3.8%            | 1.7%     |

### Question number 13

In your opinion, are there any Cuban-American politicians or individuals who will play a major role in Cuba when the transition to a democratic system occurs?

|                     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban |
|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Yes                 | 64.7%       | 58.2%           |
| No                  | 35.3%       | 41.8%           |
| Lincoln Diaz-Balart | 41.7%       | 31.8%           |
| Jorge Mas Santos    | 10.3%       | 14.1%           |
| Alex Penelas        | 8.3%        | 35.3%           |

### Question number 14

Should unrestricted travel from the U.S. to Cuba be allowed or not?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes, allowed    | 52.8%       | 74.8%           | 63.2%    |
| No, not allowed | 47.2%       | 25.2%           | 36.8%    |

## Question number 15

In political elections, how important is a candidate's position on Cuba in determining your vote - would you say it is very important, moderately important, not very important, or not at all important?

|                      | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Very Important       | 56.4%       | 32.3%           | 11.8%    |
| Moderately Important | 21.0%       | 30.1%           | 34.8%    |
| Not Very Important   | 8.8%        | 14.5%           | 34.8%    |
| Not At All Important | 13.8%       | 23.0%           | 18.7%    |

## Question number 16

In Miami right now, do you feel that all points of view on how to deal with the Castro regime are being heard or do you feel that some views are not being heard?

|                          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| All Views Are Heard      | 20.7%       | 32.5%           |
| Some Views Are Not Heard | 79.3%       | 67.5%           |

## Question number 17

Which views do you think are not being heard? Those supporting more open relations with Cuba or those supporting stronger opposition to the Cuban government, or some other views?

|                                      | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Views Supporting More Open Relations | 17.4%       | 44.7%           |
| Views Supporting Stronger Opposition | 50.8%       | 30.7%           |
| Other, Specify                       | 31.8%       | 24.6%           |

## Question number 18

What if Cuba changed to a democratic form of government. How likely is it that you would return to Cuba to live - would you say very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely?

|                   | Local Cuban |
|-------------------|-------------|
| Very Likely       | 21.9%       |
| Somewhat Likely   | 17.0%       |
| Not Very Likely   | 19.1%       |
| Not At All Likely | 42.0%       |



## Question number 19

Currently the United States allows 20,000 Cubans per year to come to the United States to live. In general, do you agree or disagree with this migration policy?

|          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Agree    | 80.1%       | 52.8%           | 54.9%    |
| Disagree | 19.9%       | 47.2%           | 45.1%    |

## Question number 20

As it stands, Cubans who leave by raft or boat are sent back to Cuba if they are intercepted before they reach U.S. soil. If they do reach U.S. soil they are allowed to stay in the U.S. Do you agree or disagree with this policy?

|          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Agree    | 33.9%       | 43.5%           | 37.4%    |
| Disagree | 66.1%       | 56.5%           | 62.6%    |

## Question number 21

If you have to choose only one reason, do you think the primary reason people want to come from Cuba to the U.S. is for economic reasons or is due to lack of freedom in Cuba?

|                                        | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|----------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Economic Reasons                       | 25.5%       | 41.6%           | 33.2%    |
| Lack of Freedom                        | 53.9%       | 39.0%           | 45.0%    |
| Insist on Both Being Equally Important | 20.5%       | 19.4%           | 21.9%    |

## Question number 22

Do you think exchanging teachers and researchers between universities in Cuba and the United States is a good thing, a bad thing, or doesn't it make any difference?

|                           | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Good Thing                | 41.1%       | 63.0%           | 66.0%    |
| Bad Thing                 | 27.7%       | 9.0%            | 9.8%     |
| Doesn't Make a difference | 31.1%       | 28.0%           | 24.3%    |

### Question number 23

Some people argue that musical groups that come from Cuba, such as Los Van Van, should not be allowed to perform in Miami. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?

|          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | Total |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|-------|
| Agree    | 45.3%       | 14.6%           | 30.7% |
| Disagree | 54.7%       | 85.4%           | 69.3% |

### Question number 24

Miami-Dade County had an ordinance that prevented the use of County funds to be used for events that include artists from Cuba. Did you agree or disagree with this policy?

|          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | Total |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|-------|
| Agree    | 48.5%       | 24.5%           | 36.5% |
| Disagree | 51.5%       | 75.5%           | 63.5% |

## Question number 25

Now I would like to ask you a few questions about the Elian Gonzalez situation. How closely did you follow the news about the story? Did you follow it very closely, somewhat closely, not very closely, or did you not pay any attention to it at all?

|                      | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Very Closely         | 72.9%       | 55.0%           | 26.9%    |
| Moderately Closely   | 19.5%       | 31.9%           | 49.0%    |
| Not Too Closely      | 6.1%        | 10.1%           | 19.6%    |
| Not Attention At All | 1.4%        | 3.0%            | 4.5%     |

## Question number 26

Thinking back to when the Elian case was going on, at that time what did you think should happen to Elian Gonzalez? Did you think he should remain in the U.S. with his relatives in Miami or return to Cuba to live with his father?

|                | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Stay Here      | 78.5%       | 33.6%           | 28.3%    |
| Return To Cuba | 21.5%       | 66.4%           | 71.7%    |

## Question number 27

From the beginning of the Elian situation to now, have you had the same opinion on what should have been done, or were there changes over time in what you thought should be done?

|                   | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Held Same Opinion | 93.5%       | 90.6%           | 88.9%    |
| Changed Over Time | 6.5%        | 9.4%            | 11.1%    |

## Question number 28

Now I want to ask you what you think of how officials and other people handled the Elian situation. First, who are the people whom you MOST DISAPPROVE of what they did?

|                 | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Miami Relatives | 6.0%        | 26.0%           | 26.5%    |
| Alex Penelas    | 3.3%        | 20.5%           | 1.8%     |
| Janet Reno      | 46.2%       | 15.3%           | 30.3%    |
| The INS         | 18.7%       | 9.5%            | 22.8%    |
| Bill Clinton    | 30.6%       | 6.8%            | 8.0%     |

## Question number 29

Who are the people whom you MOST APPROVED of what they did?

|                          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Miami Relatives          | 35.4%       | 15.8%           | 14.5%    |
| Alex Penelas             | 9.9%        | 3.5%            | .5%      |
| Cuban American Community | 16.5%       | 6.5%            | 3.0%     |
| Janet Reno               | 4.9%        | 30.0%           | 14.5%    |
| Bill Clinton             | 2.0%        | 8.5%            | 1.8%     |

## Question number 30

Now I want to ask about who will be the winners and losers coming out of the Elian situation, regardless of whether you think they did the right thing. Were there people or groups who will be HELPED in the long run by what they did in the Elian case, whether or not they did the right thing? [IF YES] Who were they?

|                          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Miami Relatives          | 5.4%        | 7.0%            | 2.3%     |
| Alex Penelas             | 1.6%        | 3.0%            | 0.0%     |
| Janet Reno               | 2.0%        | 2.3%            | 0.5%     |
| Cuban/American Community | 3.6%        | 5.8%            | 4.8%     |
| Fidel Castro             | 9.6%        | 7.5%            | 4.3%     |

## Question number 31

And were there people or groups who will be HURT or WORSE off in the long run by what they did in the Elian case, whether or not they did the right thing? [IF YES] Who were they?

|                          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Miami Relatives          | 15.9%       | 15.8%           | 14.0%    |
| The INS                  | 2.4%        | 2.0%            | 3.0%     |
| Janet Reno               | 3.0%        | 2.5%            | 3.8%     |
| Cuban/American Community | 22.6%       | 21.5%           | 9.3%     |
| Elian Gonzalez           | 16.4%       | 15.5%           | 12.3%    |

## Question number 32

In your opinion, were the interests of the Cuban-American community in Miami HELPED or HURT by the events surrounding the Elian affair?

|        | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|--------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Helped | 18.0%       | 19.6%           | 15.4%    |
| Hurt   | 82.0%       | 80.4%           | 84.6%    |

### Question number 33

Did you participate in any group activity surrounding the Elian case?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|
| Yes | 27.3%       | 6.8%            |
| No  | 72.7%       | 93.2%           |

### Question number 34

Overall, do you think the media here in Miami presented the issues in the Elian case fairly and objectively?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|
| Yes | 62.3%       | 52.7%           |
| No  | 37.7%       | 47.3%           |



## Question number 35

Do you think that the national news media presented the issues in the Elian case fairly and objectively?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 40.1%       | 64.9%           | 50.7%    |
| No  | 59.9%       | 35.1%           | 49.3%    |

## Question number 36

Would you say that the events associated with the Elian case have made you change your opinion about U.S./Cuba relations, or did they not change your opinion?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 23.6%       | 20.7%           | 15.4%    |
| No  | 76.4%       | 79.3%           | 84.6%    |

## Question number 37

Much has been said about the impact of the Elian case on ethnic relations in Miami. Do you think that ethnic relations in the Miami area are worse, about the same, or better now than before the Elian case?

|                | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban |
|----------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Worse          | 30.9%       | 37.0%           |
| About the Same | 59.6%       | 54.1%           |
| Better         | 9.4%        | 9.0%            |

## Question number 38

From what you know about the case now, do you think that the Elian Gonzalez situation should have been handled differently than it was?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 92.0%       | 83.4%           | 87.9%    |
| No  | 8.0%        | 16.6%           | 12.1%    |

In what way do you think the situation should have been handled differently?

| Counts for "yes" (multiple response "check all that apply") | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Should have let Elian stay in Miami                         | 296         | 41              | 51       |
| US should have acted sooner                                 | 119         | 103             | 160      |
| Elian's father allowed to stay in US                        | 41          | 18              | 3        |
| Other                                                       | 465         | 187             | 150      |

## Question number 38

In what way do you think the situation should have been handled differently? "OTHER" RESPONSES

|                                                | local Cuban | local non-Cuban | National |
|------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Family affair, keep politics, gov't out        | 90          | 25              | 9        |
| Should have used family court                  | 58          | 8               | 7        |
| Better media coverage                          | 38          | 20              | 31       |
| Use of force excessive                         | 79          | 20              | 33       |
| US should have returned Elian to father sooner | 33          | 21              | 12       |

## Question number 39

Miami has been represented as having the characteristics of a "banana republic." Do you think that the label is deserved?

|          | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes      | 18.3%       | 43.7%           | 29.9%    |
| No       | 69.1%       | 44.6%           | 38.9%    |
| Not Sure | 12.7%       | 11.7%           | 31.2%    |

## Question number 40

Have you ever traveled to Cuba [IF BORN IN CUBA: since you left]?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 28.2%       | 10.0%           | 4.8%     |
| No  | 71.8%       | 89.8%           | 95.3%    |

## Question number 41

Are you an active member of a professional and/or civic organization?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 14.0%       | 23.9%           | 26.8%    |
| No  | 86.0%       | 76.1%           | 73.2%    |

## Question number 42

Are you an active member of an organization that works directly on issues affecting Cuba?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 4.5%        | .8%             | 1.5%     |
| No  | 95.2%       | 99.3%           | 98.5%    |

## Question number 43

Do you belong to a labor union?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 6.0%        | 9.0%            | 13.0%    |
| No  | 94.0%       | 91.0%           | 87.0%    |

## Question number 44

Are you a U.S. Citizen?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 70.7%       | 70.2%           | 95.8%    |
| No  | 29.3%       | 29.8%           | 4.3%     |

## Question number 45

Are you registered to vote?

|     | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes | 91.0%       | 90.0%           | 89.5%    |
| No  | 9.0%        | 10.0%           | 10.5%    |

### Question number 48

Suppose that on Election Day this year you could vote on key issues as well as candidates. Please tell me whether you would vote for or against each one of the following propositions: Would you vote for or against: re-establishing US diplomatic relations with Cuba?

|                                                           | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| For re-establishing US diplomatic relations with Cuba     | 38.2%       | 70.1%           | 82.1%    |
| Against re-establishing US diplomatic relations with Cuba | 61.8%       | 29.9%           | 17.9%    |

### Question number 49

Would you vote for or against: ending the US trade embargo with Cuba?

|                        | Local Cuban | Local Non-Cuban | National |
|------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|
| For ending Embargo     | 37.5%       | 59.2%           | 64.7%    |
| Against ending Embargo | 62.5%       | 40.8%           | 35.3%    |

## Comparison of selected questions over the last 10 years

| % CUBAN SAMPLES (all 2000 data is preliminary)         |        |        |        |        |        |               |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|
|                                                        |        |        |        |        |        |               |
| <b>WHEN WILL MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGE OCCUR IN CUBA?</b> |        |        |        |        |        |               |
|                                                        | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00        |
| Within 1 year                                          | 28%    | 47%    | 28%    | 15%    | 11%    | 7.3%          |
| in 2 to 5 years                                        | 35%    | 30%    | 29%    | 26%    | 25%    | 25.1%         |
| in 6 to 10 years                                       | 5%     | 3%     | 4%     | 9%     | 14%    | 8.9%          |
| over ten years                                         | 3%     | 2%     | 4%     | 4%     | 11%    | 11.1%         |
| never                                                  | 9%     | 4%     | 8%     | 18%    | 17%    | 21.4%         |
| don't know/nr                                          | 21%    | 14%    | 26%    | 27%    | 23%    | 1.9%          |
| <b>ESTABLISH NATIONAL DIALOG?</b>                      |        |        |        |        |        |               |
|                                                        | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00        |
| Strongly Favor                                         | 20.0%  | 29.1%  | 20.6%  | 18.9%  | 27.8%  | 31.3%         |
| Mostly Favor                                           | 15.5%  | 17.1%  | 18.8%  | 17.7%  | 20.5%  | 15.7%         |
| Mostly Oppose                                          | 5.7%   | 7.6%   | 3.2%   | 6.2%   | 13.0%  | 10.7%         |
| Strongly Oppose                                        | 40.8%  | 29.1%  | 37.3%  | 37.8%  | 32.3%  | 33.3%         |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                                    | 7.2%   | 10.8%  | 11.8%  | 9.7%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%          |
| Don't know/no answer                                   | 10.8%  | 6.3%   | 8.3%   | 9.8%   | 6.4%   | 9.0%          |
| <b>TIGHTENING THE EMBARGO?</b>                         |        |        |        |        |        |               |
|                                                        | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00        |
| Strongly Favor                                         | 68.2%  | 74.0%  | 69.1%  | 71.0%  | 71.9%  | 56.9%(Favor)  |
| Mostly Favor                                           | 11.8%  | 8.4%   | 10.8%  | 9.0%   |        |               |
| Mostly Oppose                                          | 5.3%   | 5.1%   | 5.3%   | 4.6%   | 20.1%  | 34.2%(Oppose) |
| Strongly Oppose                                        | 7.0%   | 6.6%   | 9.0%   | 10.8%  |        |               |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                                    | 0.0%   | 0.5%   | 0.0%   | 0.6%   |        |               |
| Don't know/no answer                                   | 7.7%   | 5.3%   | 5.8%   | 4.1%   | 8.0%   | 8.9%(Don't kn |
| note: different wording throughout years.              |        |        |        |        |        |               |
|                                                        |        |        |        |        |        |               |



| SUPPORT US INVASION OF CUBA?               |        |        |        |        |        |        |
|--------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|                                            | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00 |
| Strongly Favor                             | 44.3%  | 37.1%  | 43.8%  | 44.6%  | 49.7%  | 46.0%  |
| Mostly Favor                               | 12.0%  | 12.4%  | 11.5%  | 10.1%  | 13.3%  | 10.2%  |
| Mostly Oppose                              | 11.0%  | 10.4%  | 8.8%   | 10.5%  | 13.7%  | 9.3%   |
| Strongly Oppose                            | 22.7%  | 32.1%  | 27.8%  | 27.9%  | 19.5%  | 27.6%  |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                        | 0.0%   | 1.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.2%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   |
| Don't know/no answer                       | 10.0%  | 7.0%   | 8.2%   | 6.7%   | 3.8%   | 7.0%   |
| SUPPORT EXILE INVASION                     |        |        |        |        |        |        |
|                                            | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00 |
| Strongly Favor                             | 57.7%  | 58.1%  | 56.9%  | 55.4%  | 53.8%  | 51.7%  |
| Mostly Favor                               | 13.3%  | 11.1%  | 11.8%  | 13.4%  | 15.3%  | 12.6%  |
| Mostly Oppose                              | 8.3%   | 8.3%   | 7.5%   | 7.7%   | 13.3%  | 8.9%   |
| Strongly Oppose                            | 13.7%  | 17.2%  | 18.1%  | 17.3%  | 14.5%  | 19.9%  |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                        | 0.0%   | 0.8%   | 0.0%   | 0.2%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   |
| Don't know/no answer                       | 7.0%   | 4.5%   | 5.7%   | 6.1%   | 3.0%   | 6.9%   |
| SUPPORT INTERNAL REBELLION                 |        |        |        |        |        |        |
|                                            | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00 |
| Strongly Favor                             | 61.0%  | 52.3%  | 53.2%  | 52.0%  | N/A    | N/A    |
| Mostly Favor                               | 18.3%  | 21.2%  | 18.3%  | 17.6%  | N/A    | N/A    |
| Mostly Oppose                              | 4.2%   | 9.6%   | 7.2%   | 9.7%   | N/A    | N/A    |
| Strongly Oppose                            | 9.7%   | 11.8%  | 14.0%  | 14.6%  | N/A    | N/A    |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                        | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.5%   | N/A    | N/A    |
| Don't know/no answer                       | 6.8%   | 5.1%   | 7.30%  | 5.70%  | N/A    | N/A    |
| SUPPORT HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP INSIDE OF CUBA? |        |        |        |        |        |        |
|                                            | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00 |
| Strongly Favor                             | 69.0%  | 73.2%  | 71.4%  | 73.9%  | 71.6%  | 76.9%  |
| Mostly Favor                               | 14.5%  | 15.1%  | 15.0%  | 13.5%  | 17.8%  | 14.1%  |
| Mostly Oppose                              | 2.2%   | 2.0%   | 2.3%   | 2.2%   | 3.1%   | 1.8%   |
| Strongly Oppose                            | 4.8%   | 3.8%   | 4.7%   | 3.6%   | 4.4%   | 3.4%   |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                        | 2.0%   | 3.0%   | 2.2%   | 2.1%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   |
| Don't know/no answer                       | 7.5%   | 3.0%   | 4.5%   | 4.8%   | 3.2%   | 3.7%   |

| ALLOW MEDCINE SALES TO CUBA?                          |        |        |        |        |        |                |
|-------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------|
|                                                       | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00         |
| Strongly Favor                                        | N/A    | N/A    | 29.3%  | 35.2%  | 28.1%  | 43.1%          |
| Mostly Favor                                          | N/A    | N/A    | 18.5%  | 24.5%  | 25.8%  | 21.2%          |
| Mostly Oppose                                         | N/A    | N/A    | 7.5%   | 7.3%   | 11.5%  | 6.4%           |
| Strongly Oppose                                       | N/A    | N/A    | 31.8%  | 25.2%  | 31.6%  | 26.6%          |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                                   | N/A    | N/A    | 8.8%   | 4.5%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%           |
| Don't know/no answer                                  | N/A    | N/A    | 4.2%   | 3.3%   | 3.0%   | 2.6%           |
| ALLOW FOOD SALES TO CUBA?                             |        |        |        |        |        |                |
|                                                       | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00         |
| Strongly Favor                                        | N/A    | N/A    | 14.8%  | 16.3%  | 20.3%  | 37.3%          |
| Mostly Favor                                          | N/A    | N/A    | 7.8%   | 11.0%  | 18.6%  | 17.4%          |
| Mostly Oppose                                         | N/A    | N/A    | 9.3%   | 11.2%  | 16.1%  | 8.6%           |
| Strongly Oppose                                       | N/A    | N/A    | 53.1%  | 51.4%  | 41.4%  | 33.8%          |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                                   | N/A    | N/A    | 11.8%  | 6.4%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%           |
| Don't know/no answer                                  | N/A    | N/A    | 3.2%   | 3.8%   | 3.2%   | 3.0%           |
| ALLOW UNRESTRICTED TRAVEL TO CUBA?                    |        |        |        |        |        |                |
|                                                       | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00         |
| Strongly Favor                                        | 29.8%  | 32.8%  | 21.6%  | 21.1%  | N/A    | 50.6% (ALLOW)  |
| Mostly Favor                                          | 13.3%  | 15.2%  | 17.0%  | 14.5%  | N/A    |                |
| Mostly Oppose                                         | 5.5%   | 5.0%   | 4.8%   | 8.6%   | N/A    | 45.3% (NOT ALL |
| Strongly Oppose                                       | 38.8%  | 33.1%  | 43.4%  | 47.5%  | N/A    |                |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                                   | 7.8%   | 10.4%  | 8.7%   | 4.9%   | N/A    | 0.0%           |
| Don't know/no answer                                  | 4.7%   | 3.5%   | 4.5%   | 3.5%   | N/A    | 4.1% (DON'T K  |
| IF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE OCCURS WOULD YOU RETURN TO LIVE? |        |        |        |        |        |                |
|                                                       | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00         |
| Very Likely                                           | 15.7%  | 18.0%  | 17.5%  | 15.7%  | 14.0%  | 21.2%          |
| Some What Likely                                      | 11.2%  | 12.7%  | 11.1%  | 12.9%  | 14.7%  | 16.5%          |
| Not Very Likely                                       | 17.0%  | 15.4%  | 18.8%  | 17.8%  | 18.3%  | 18.6%          |
| Not at all Likely                                     | 50.7%  | 50.0%  | 50.1%  | 49.8%  | 51.1%  | 40.7%          |
| Don't know/no answer                                  | 5.5%   | 3.8%   | 2.5%   | 3.9%   | 1.9%   | 3.1%           |

| HOW LIKELY ARE YOU TO TRAVEL TO CUBA IF RESTRICTIONS ARE LIFTED? |        |        |        |        |        |        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|                                                                  | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00 |
| Very Likely                                                      | 23.3%  | 27.2%  | 23.3%  | 25.8%  | N/A    | N/A    |
| Some What Likely                                                 | 12.7%  | 12.7%  | 9.2%   | 14.3%  | N/A    | N/A    |
| Not Very Likely                                                  | 10.0%  | 7.1%   | 8.3%   | 8.7%   | N/A    | N/A    |
| Not at all Likely                                                | 39.0%  | 23.2%  | 24.1%  | 18.8%  | N/A    | N/A    |
| Not with Fidel/Raul                                              | 13.2%  | 28.1%  | 32.8%  | 31.4%  | N/A    | N/A    |
| Don't know/no answer                                             | 1.8%   | 1.7%   | 2.3%   | 1.0%   | N/A    | N/A    |

WHERE DO YOU GET MOST INFO ABOUT CUBA?

|                        | Mar-91 | Oct-91 | Jun-93 | Mar-95 | Jun-97 | Oct-00 |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Television             | 48.7%  | 41.9%  | 40.4%  | 62.0%  | 51.3%  | 55.3%  |
| Radio                  | 41.2%  | 23.2%  | 24.3%  | 31.6%  | 21.2%  | 14.4%  |
| Newspaper              | 31.1%  | 18.4%  | 18.0%  | 32.1%  | 19.7%  | 16.7%  |
| Word of Mouth          | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 3.5%   |
| Friends living in Cuba | 11.0%  | 5.5%   | 4.8%   | 4.6%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   |
| Friends living here    | 9.1%   | 5.1%   | 5.3%   | 7.3%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   |
| Other                  | 0.0%   | 2.8%   | 0.9%   | 3.1%   | 6.8%   | 8.8%   |
| Don't know/no answer   | 0.0%   | 3.1%   | 6.3%   | 0.0%   | 1.0%   | 1.4%   |

note: may add up to more than 100% because one respondent may have listed more than one source of information.