2014 FIU CUBAPoll

HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA

FIU Cuban Research Institute
FOREWORD

For more than two decades, FIU professors Guillermo J. Grenier and Hugh Gladwin have carefully tracked the opinions of the Cuban-American community in South Florida. Their ongoing poll was designed to reliably measure the views of Cuban Americans on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The consistency of some of the survey responses, as well as the shift in others, provides the most complete picture of Cuban-American political attitudes over time.

The FIU Cuba Poll has become a standard reference on the public opinions and demographic profile of Cuban immigrants and their descendants in the United States. The poll’s findings have circulated widely, appearing in wire services, major newspapers, and television news, as well as in academic analyses of the political ideology and behavior of Cuban Americans. Scholars and journalists have extensively cited the FIU Cuba Poll as solid evidence of the generational and ideological shifts among Cuban Americans and their impact on U.S. policy toward Cuba. The survey data have been mined to document and analyze Cuban Americans’ attitudes toward maintaining the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba, re-establishing diplomatic relations, negotiating with the Cuban government, supporting human rights on the island, traveling and sending remittances to family members still in Cuba, and other policies. In addition, the 2014 FIU Cuba Poll included questions on several timely issues, such as the impact of Raúl Castro’s economic reforms, the development of small private businesses on the island, Cuba’s new migration and travel law, and the respondents’ voting preferences in the last presidential elections.

The 2014 FIU Cuba Poll reveals numerous differences in the public opinions of Cuban Americans based on their year of arrival in the United States, as well as age and place of birth. As a group, those who left Cuba before and after 1994 display different attitudinal patterns. For instance, recent arrivals are more likely than earlier ones to oppose the continuation of the embargo; support a dialogue among exiles, dissidents, and the Cuban government; and favor sending medicines, food, and money, as well as unrestricted travel to Cuba. Furthermore, the most recent wave of Cuban immigrants tends to favor the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States, to a much larger degree than those who arrived earlier. In sum, the findings of the poll suggest that Cuban immigrants who left the island in the last two decades support engaging with Cuba more often than those who left in the first decades after the revolution. As these later immigrant waves increase their weight within the Cuban-American community, as well as the numbers of those born in the United States increase relative to those born abroad, swift demographic changes are reshaping Cuban-American attitudes regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba.

The Cuban Research Institute has proudly sponsored the FIU Cuba Poll over time, together with FIU’s Institute for Public Opinion Research, the Center for Labor Research and Studies, and the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies. The Brookings Institution, the Cuba Study Group, the Ford Foundation, The Miami Herald, the Christopher Reynolds Foundation, and the South Florida Sun-Sentinel have funded the poll in the past. This year, we were fortunate to receive the financial contributions of the Trimpa Group and the Open Society Foundations.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the co-principal investigators Guillermo J. Grenier and Hugh Gladwin for their sustained efforts to study the changing attitudes of the Cuban-American population. I would also like to acknowledge the enthusiastic support of the staff members of the Cuban Research Institute: Sebastián Arcos, Associate Director; Aymee Correa, Public Affairs Manager, and Paola Salavarria Romero, Office Assistant; as well as our student assistants Lennie Gómez and Alfredo González.

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Director and Professor
Cuban Research Institute
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- A slight majority of the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County opposes continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Countywide, 52% of the respondents oppose continuing the embargo. This percentage rises among Cuban Americans ages 18-29, 62% of whom oppose continuing the embargo. Similarly, 58% of those arriving since 1995 oppose continuing the embargo. Among registered voters, the split is nearly equal, with 51% in favor of continuing the embargo and 49% opposing its continuation. Support for continuing the embargo is strongest among Republican registered voters (figure 2).

- A large majority favors diplomatic relations with Cuba (68%), with younger respondents strongly backing the policy shift (90%). Support for re-establishing diplomatic ties maintains a solid majority among all age groups up to age 70, after which it drops to a third of the population supporting the policy. Those arriving since 1995 favor the policy shift by 80%. A majority of registered voters express support—55%. This number balloons to 83% among non-registered voters (figure 4).

- A large majority of respondents (69%) favor the lifting of travel restrictions impeding all Americans from traveling to Cuba. Younger respondents overwhelmingly endorse this policy shift (89%), as do the most recent arrivals (80%). Approximately 58% of registered voters also favor unrestricted travel by all Americans (figure 5).

- Similarly, 71% of the respondents support the continuation of “people-to-people” travel opportunities currently endorsed by U.S. policy, with the two earliest cohorts falling short of majority support for the policy (49% and 40% respectively). Sixty percent of registered voters favor the policy as well (figure 6).

- Cuba is one of only four countries designated as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”—a list that includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. This designation restricts a broad range of trade and financial engagements as well as penalizes people and countries engaging in certain trade with Cuba. Sixty-three percent of Cuban Americans believe that Cuba should remain on the list. All cohorts of arrival favor this policy, although the most recent arrivals—since 1995—express the least support—56%. A large majority of 18–29-year-old respondents—65%—would like to see Cuba removed from the list. However, an even larger majority of registered voters (70%) would like to keep Cuba on the list (figure 9).

- A large majority of respondents favor the “wet foot/dry foot” immigration policy (63%), although those coming after 1980 and younger respondents support it considerably more than those coming before 1980 (figure 8). Fifty-six percent of registered voters favor the policy.

- The Cuban Adjustment Act receives strong backing from the respondents. Eighty-six percent strongly or mostly support the policy that has been applied to Cuban arrivals on U.S. soil since 1966. Ninety-two percent of recent arrivals favor the policy while 64% of 1959–1964 arrivals agree with the policy. Eighty percent of registered voters support the policy (figure 7).

- Registered voters were asked how likely they would be to vote for a candidate for political office who supported the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Fifty-three percent responded they would be very likely or somewhat likely to do so. Younger voters expressed stronger support—75% in the 18–29 cohort (figure 11).

- Registered voters were also asked about the likelihood of voting for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with a policy that increases support for independent business owners in Cuba. Fifty-seven percent of the voters said they were likely to do so (very/somewhat). Seventy-one percent of new arrivals, compared to 40% of the earliest post-revolution arrivals, said they were likely to do so. Almost twice as many younger voters (18–29) were likely to vote for such a candidate as older voters (65+)—73% to 37% (figure 12).

- The final question on embargo options asked registered voters how likely they would be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with a policy that increases pressure on the Cuban government over human rights. Eighty-one percent of voters said they were very or somewhat likely to do so. A large majority of all age groups expressed this view (figure 13).
INTRODUCTION

The Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County is the largest concentration of Cubans outside the island. The community’s significance for local and national elections is frequently highlighted during election cycles and its members are often credited, or criticized, for controlling U.S. policy toward Cuba. When we initiated the FIU Cuba Poll in 1991, our intention was to take an ideological snapshot of the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County (formerly Dade County) at a time of significant changes in the geopolitical environment. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transitions occurring in Eastern Europe had a direct impact on the Cuban state. We were curious to see what impact these global changes would have on the diasporic population’s view of the future of U.S./Cuba relations. We learned a great deal about our community in that first poll. We learned that desire to promote change on the island was just as strong in 1991 as in 1961, but years of frustration and false hopes had created a community that was not monolithic in its approaches to encouraging changes on the island. That finding alone—that Cuban Americans had diverse opinions about how to approach U.S./Cuba relations—was newsworthy.

Before we started polling the community, its homogeneous nature when it came to U.S./Cuba relations was taken for granted (even by us, the investigators). All Cuban Americans allegedly supported current U.S. policies. All Cuban Americans supposedly wanted to tighten the screws on the Cuban government to force changes on the island. Our initial poll found that although most Cubans did support some elements of U.S. policy, others also hoped for policy changes that would facilitate travel and humanitarian contact between Cubans on the island and in South Florida. The more conciliatory voices were not necessarily expressing support for the regime, we must add. They were expressing their desire to promote change just as much as those advocating more isolationist policies. Many articulated the frustration accumulated in over 30 years of living a diasporic existence that had seen no changes in U.S. policy and, more importantly for them, no changes on the island—at least not the types of changes that would finally unite Cubans everywhere.

We conducted two polls in 1991, the only time we’ve been able to find funding for two polls that close together, because we felt that neither Cuba nor the Cuban-American community in South Florida would ever be the same after this historic moment. We were right, but not as dramatically as we anticipated. Cuba underwent and survived El Período Especial (the Special Period of economic crisis, beginning in 1989) and the application of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which tightened the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The Cuban-American community also survived as a population living in the diaspora, the imposition of travel restrictions by the George W. Bush administration, and an intense influx of new Cubans after the 1995 immigration agreement with Cuba established a regular migration flow for the first time in decades.

Many of the findings from the first polls more than 20 years ago have remained significant in the form of trends. Those exiles who experienced the seismic changes brought about by the 1959 revolution are more likely to express support for the isolationist strategies codified in U.S. policy toward Cuba. Subsequent waves express more of a willingness to endorse policies that increase contact between Cubans here and there. Time has also seen a slow weakening of the Republican Party hold on registered Cuban-American voters. From a dominance of 70% in the early 1990s, registered Republicans have declined to approximately 53% of the population in the current poll. Yet, when it comes to U.S. Cuba policy, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

This poll is a continuation of the tradition started more than two decades ago. We remain curious about how the Cuban-American community views U.S./Cuba relations. We are aware of the heterogeneity of the community and are becoming more accustomed to hearing its many voices. This survey shows that members of the Cuban diaspora in Miami-Dade County have diverse views of how they would like the U.S. government to deal with the Cuban government. Some support continuity, others support a change of course. Most favor a mixture of both. What remains clear is that Cuba inspires debate and passions in all Cubans. Those who came to the United States immediately after the revolution are an increasingly smaller percentage of the population, but their influence remains strong even as their ideas are transformed and reinterpreted by newer migrants from the island.

Our poll preserves a record of the continuity and change occurring in the Cuban-American community in South Florida. It is a record of a transition as dramatic and far-reaching as the transitions occurring on the island. This is our transition and it’s happening daily, poll or no poll, as Cubans everywhere look to the future with the hope that, indeed, todo tiempo futuro tiene que ser mejor (all future times have to be better).

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Guillermo J. Grenier is Professor of Sociology and Graduate Program Director in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University.

Born in Havana, Cuba, Dr. Grenier is one of the founders of the Miami school of social analysis, and has authored or coauthored six books and dozens of articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation, and Cuban-American ideological profiles, particularly in the Greater Miami area. His books include This Land Is Our Land: Newcomers and Established Residents in Miami, with Alex Stepick, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn (University of California Press, 2003); The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States, with Lisandro Pérez (Allyn & Bacon, 2002); Newcomers in the Workplace: Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. Economy, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick (Temple University Press, 1994; winner of the Conrad Arensberg Award, American Anthropological Association); and Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change, edited with Alex Stepick (University Press of Florida, 1992).

Dr. Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a Faculty Fellow of the University of Notre Dame’s Institute of Latino Studies as well as Director of the Florida Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures nationally and internationally on his research. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology and his M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of New Mexico at Albuquerque.

Hugh Gladwin is the past Director of the Institute for Public Opinion Research and Associate Professor in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University.

His major area of research is the application of survey research and GIS tools to understand large urban settings of high cultural and demographic diversity. Within that framework, a particular interest is to better model the interactions between the human population and natural systems such as the South Florida ecosystem and natural events like hurricanes and climate change.

He is a coeditor (with Walter Gillis Peacock and Betty Hearrn Morrow) and contributor to the book Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the Sociology of Disaster (Routledge, 1997) and author of numerous publications and presentations on disaster mitigation, public health, and public opinion, especially among Cuban Americans. Along with Dr. Arthur Heise, he directed the FIU/Florida Poll, which tracked public opinion statewide from 1988 to 2006. He is a research scientist in the Florida Coastal Everglades Long-Term Ecological Research project (FCE LTER) and the Mexico/US LTER Hurricane Research network.

In Miami-Dade County, Dr. Gladwin serves as a member of the Steering Committee of the Local Mitigation Strategy and was appointed by the County Commission to be on the county Climate Change Advisory Task Force. He is also a member of the Socioeconomic Working Group of the NOAA Hurricane Forecast Improvement Project. He holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology from Stanford University.
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This survey looks at how the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County, Florida, views current U.S./Cuba policy. To appraise trends in the community we ask many of the same questions we’ve asked for more than 20 years. We measure support for the embargo as well as changing individual interests associated with U.S./Cuba policy such as travel restrictions, trade and investment opportunities, diplomatic engagement, and U.S. immigration policy. We also measure support for political candidates who might be willing to propose changes in the embargo in exchange for policies that favor the strengthening of small business growth and human rights on the island. The poll carefully documents the respondents’ demographic characteristics and how they relate to their attitudes toward U.S./Cuba relations.

The 2014 FIU Cuba Poll was conducted between February and May 2014. It was administered to a random sample of 1,000 Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County, age 18 and over. The sample was generated from telephone exchanges using standard random-digit-dialing procedures to ensure that each phone number has an equal chance of being chosen for the sample. Interviews were conducted with respondents who have both landline phones and cell phones. Bilingual interviewers conducted the survey in Spanish and English, depending on the respondents’ preference. The countywide margin of error is plus or minus 3.1% at the 95% confidence level. For more methodological details, see Appendix 1.

This report presents the responses to key questions. The exact wording for each question, along with the Spanish version, is included in Appendix 2. The full survey is available at cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/.

The poll carefully documents the respondents’ demographic characteristics and how they relate to their attitudes toward U.S./Cuba relations.
Respondents were asked how well they thought the United States embargo of Cuba was working. An overwhelming majority, 71%, expressed the view that the embargo was “not working at all” or “not very well.” Younger respondents, the most recent arrivals, and non-registered voters are more likely to view the embargo as working “well” or “very well.” The difference is evident in the age cohorts: 52% of respondents 65 and over feel that the embargo has not worked at all, while only 27% of younger respondents (18–29) express that opinion.
Fifty-two percent of the respondents oppose the continuation of the embargo.

Figure 2: Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba?

A slight majority of the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County opposes continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Countywide, 52% of the respondents oppose continuing the embargo. This percentage rises among Cuban Americans ages 18-29, 62% of whom oppose continuing the embargo. Similarly, 58% of those arriving since 1995 oppose continuing the embargo. Among registered voters, the split is nearly equal, with 51% in favor of continuing the embargo and 49% opposing its continuation.

The increase in the opposition to the embargo continues a trend fueled not only by an ideological shift among exiles frustrated with the inability of the embargo to bring about the desired changes on the island. It is also the result of the profound shift in the demographic composition of the Cuban origin population in the Miami area. More than a third of all Cuban Americans living in Miami today have arrived since 1995. In our survey, these respondents are most likely to oppose a continuation of the embargo. They are also the least likely to be registered to vote.
Most respondents favor increasing economic relations with the island.

Figure 3:

- Allow companies to sell medicine to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?
- Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?
- Some U.S. companies have managed to establish limited business relations with Cuba to sell grain, other agricultural products, and medicine. Should this kind of trade be expanded, kept the same, or stopped?

Although the Cuban-American population is split on the support expressed for the embargo, the numbers jump dramatically when specific policy alternatives are presented. An overwhelming majority of the respondents endorse the selling of medicine and food and a significant majority supports either expanding or maintaining the existing limited trade relations of companies selling agricultural and medical products to the island.

A large majority of the respondents favor reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba. See Figure 4.
Sixty-eight percent of Cubans living in Miami-Dade County favor diplomatic relations with Cuba.

**Figure 4:** Do you favor or oppose the U.S. re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba?

A large majority of the respondents favor reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba (68%), with younger respondents very strongly backing the policy shift (90%). Support for re-establishing diplomatic ties maintains a solid majority among all age groups up to age 70, after which it drops to a third of the population favoring the policy. Cubans arriving after 1995 are the most likely group to endorse the re-establishment of relations. But substantial support is found in all arrival cohorts. This is evident when we look at the opinion of registered voters. A majority of registered voters, 55%, express support for re-establishing diplomatic relations with the island. This number balloons to 83% among non-registered voters.
Sixty-nine percent of the respondents favor unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba.

Figure 5: Should unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba be allowed or not?

Cuba is the only country in the world with which the United States has a policy of restricting travel to some American citizens and not others. When asked if unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba should be allowed or not, 69% of the respondents responded affirmatively. The earliest arrivals to the United States, however, express strong opposition to the opening up of unrestricted travel to all Americans. Fifty-eight percent of registered voters endorse this type of policy shift in relations with the island.
Seventy-one percent of the respondents support the continuation of "people-to-people" travel opportunities.

**Figure 6:** Currently, all Americans can travel to Cuba in people-to-people trips organized by special travel agencies and designed to encourage communication among citizens of the U.S. and citizens of Cuba. These trips are usually organized for educational, religious or research purposes. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this type of people-to-people travel?

A large majority of the respondents favor the continuation of "people-to-people" travel opportunities currently endorsed by U.S. policy, with the two earliest cohorts falling short of majority support for the policy. Sixty percent of registered voters favor the policy as well.
Eighty-six percent of the respondents support the Cuban Adjustment Act.

**Figure 7:** Since 1966, the entrance of Cubans into the United States has been regulated by the Cuban Adjustment Act. This law stipulates that Cuban citizens and their accompanying spouses and children may get a green card and become residents of the U.S. one year after arriving in the country. This automatic application process is not usual for other immigrant groups. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose the current policy of accepting Cubans into the U.S.?

The Cuban Adjustment Act receives strong backing across all cohorts. The support increases among more recent waves, but if there is a policy that receives consistent endorsement across all demographic cohorts, the Cuban Adjustment Act is that policy. Eighty-six percent favor strongly or mostly the policy that has been applied to Cuban arrivals on U.S. soil since 1966. Ninety-two percent of recent arrivals support the policy, as do 64% of 1959–1964 arrivals. Eighty percent of registered voters favor the policy.
Sixty-three percent of Cubans in Miami-Dade County support the current “wet foot/dry foot” policy.

Figure 8: As it stands, Cubans who leave by raft or boat are sent back to Cuba if they are intercepted before they reach U.S. soil. If they do reach U.S. soil they are allowed to stay in the U.S. Do you agree or disagree with this policy?

A large majority of the respondents favor the “wet foot/dry foot” U.S. Cuban immigration policy, a revision of the Cuban Adjustment Act initiated as a result of the 1995 immigration agreement between the United States and Cuba. Respondents leaving Cuba after 1980 are more supportive of the policy than earlier arrivals, as are younger respondents. Majority support also holds among registered voters.

The Cuban Adjustment Act receives strong backing across all cohorts.

See Figure 7.
Sixty-three percent of Cuban Americans believe that Cuba should remain on the State Department list of countries designated as sponsors of terrorism.

Figure 9: The U.S. Department of State [or U.S. government] includes Cuba on a list of four countries which the U.S. government considers to be State Sponsors of Terrorism. This designation penalizes persons and organizations engaging in certain activities with Cuba and the other countries on the list. The other countries on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Do you believe that Cuba should be kept on that list of penalized countries that support terrorism, or be taken off the list?

Cuba is one of only four countries designated as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”—a list that includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. This designation restricts a broad range of trade and financial engagements as well as penalizes people and countries engaging in certain trade with Cuba. The respondents express strong support for keeping Cuba on the list across all arrival cohorts. Even the post-1995 cohort expresses majority support for keeping Cuba on the list. Only young respondents (18–29) show a strong willingness to remove Cuba from the list.
Sixty-four percent of registered voters consider a candidate’s position on Cuba to be important in determining their vote.

**Figure 10:** In political elections, how important is a candidate’s position on Cuba in determining your vote. Would you say it is very important, moderately important, not very important, or not at all important?

Even after 55 years after the revolution, the topic of Cuba maintains a high profile in South Florida social, economic, political, and cultural discourse. For Cuban Americans in the region, Cuba is never far away, in the physical or mental geographies of daily life. In the political arena, a large majority of Cuban-American registered voters still consider a candidate’s position on Cuba to be important in determining their vote. The salience of Cuba in the local political discourse is placed in context in the following section.

It is widely assumed that the salience of Cuba is accompanied by unequivocal support for the embargo. The responses presented in figures 11–13 show that Cuban Americans are willing to endorse candidates who propose policies that maintain pressure for change on the Cuban government and are willing to discard the embargo in exchange for new policy options.
Fifty-three percent of registered voters would likely vote for a candidate supporting the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Figure 11: How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba?

Registered voters were asked how likely they would be to vote for a candidate for political office who supported the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Fifty-three percent responded that they would be very likely or somewhat likely to do so. Younger voters expressed stronger support—75% in the 18–29 group.

Cuban Americans are willing to endorse a candidate who supports the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. See Figure 12.
Fifty-seven percent of registered voters would likely vote for a candidate supporting replacing the embargo with a policy increasing support for independent business owners.

**Figure 12:** How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with increased support for independent small business owners in Cuba?

Registered voters were also asked about the likelihood of voting for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with a policy that increases support for independent business owners in Cuba. Fifty-seven percent of the voters said they were likely to do so (very/somewhat). Seventy-one percent of new arrivals, compared to 40% of the earliest post-revolution arrivals, said they were likely to do so. Almost twice as many younger voters (18–29) were likely to vote for such a candidate than older voters (65+)—73% to 37%.
Eighty-one percent of registered voters would likely vote for a candidate supporting replacing the embargo with a policy increasing support for human rights.

Figure 13: How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with support for increasing pressure on the Cuban government over human rights?

The final question on embargo options asked registered voters how likely they would be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with a policy that increases pressure on the Cuban government over human rights issues. Eighty-one percent of voters said they were very or somewhat likely to vote for such a candidate. A large majority of all age groups expressed this view.

These responses indicate that Cubans are willing to support a shift in U.S. policy if the shift includes provisions that continue to exert pressure for change on the Cuban government.
Selected Trends

How this Poll Compares to Previous FIU Cuba Polls

This section presents a comparison of key questions from this poll with our previous polls. Some of these comparisons highlight trends in opinions and behaviors of the Cuban-American population over the last 23 years.

Support for the Embargo

**Figure 14**: Favor continuing embargo

Support for the embargo has steadily decreased within the Cuban-American population in the Miami area. During the 1990s, the five polls we conducted tabulated an average of 84% support for maintaining the embargo. Since 2000 to the present, the average support for the embargo has diminished to a little under 56%. This decline could largely be explained by the incorporation of post-1995 migrants into the population. Figure 14 presents the numbers.

Support for Unrestricted Travel

**Figure 15**: Unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba should be allowed

continued on next page
Support for Unrestricted Travel continued

Lifting the restrictions on travel to Cuba for all Americans has received increasing support over the years. The five surveys conducted in the 1990s averaged 43% support for lifting travel restrictions, while the six post-2000 surveys average 58% support. The dramatic increase between the 1997 poll and the 2000 poll indicates that the opinions of the post-1995 migrants made a difference on this issue.

Voter Registration and Presidential Vote

Figure 16: Political party registration

After the 2012 president election, exit polls estimates of the Cuban-American vote for Barack Obama ranged as high as 49%. This poll represents the first empirical attempt at measuring the actual Cuban vote using a probability sample. Either the exit poll estimates were exceedingly high or many Cuban-American voters took the opportunity to “vote again” and rescind some of the support allotted to President Obama back in 2012.

For our purposes, the current 34% support for the Democratic candidate is less significant than the continued decline in support for the Republican candidate. Although still a majority among Cuban-American voters in Miami, Republican Party registrations have declined over the years while Independents and Democrats have increased. This trend is changing the political landscape of the Cuban-American community and the nationwide significance of the Cuban-American vote.

Mar-91 Oct-91 Mar-04 Mar-07 Mar-08 Sep-11 May-14

Republican Democrat Independent

70% 67% 69% 66% 52% 56% 53%

16% 17% 18% 18% 27% 23% 25%

14% 14% 13% 15% 21% 20% 22%
Figure 17: In the past presidential election, did you vote for Mitt Romney or Barack Obama, or did you not vote for either? (Asked of registered voters)

Year Left Cuba

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<th>Obama</th>
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Age Range

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Cuban-American presidential votes or vote intentions in past poll about election in

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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>McCain 65%</td>
<td>Obama – 35%</td>
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</table>
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Much is made of the transitions occurring on the island and their impact on Cubans here and there. The present survey highlights an equally important transition taking place in the Miami area, a demographic, generational, and ideological shift that can potentially have a great impact on Cubans on the island, as well as Cubans in the diaspora.

How to deal with Cuba, 55 years after the revolution, is a contested issue. Older respondents and those leaving Cuba before 1980 as an aggregate are still committed to the isolation of Cuba from U.S. citizens and businesses. Even though the policies put in place in the 1960s to promote regime change have not had the desired effect, lifting the embargo, for example, is often viewed as a capitulation to the Cuban government. The more recent arrivals, particularly those coming since 1995, are much more likely to view the policy status quo as negotiable.

Mass migration of Cubans to Florida and the United States is likely to persist in the coming decades. The changes in the population of Cuban origin in South Florida will also continue on many levels. As our surveys show, one of the dimensions of change will be attitudes associated with U.S./Cuba policy. As more new arrivals become integrated into the democratic processes of their adopted country, voices for changing the current policy will inevitably become louder. Existing policies have contributed to the transformation of South Florida while contributing much less directly to the transformation of the Cuban state. While it’s difficult to predict what kind of policy changes will occur as the Cuban-American population continues its transition from one composed mostly of exiles to one composed predominantly of immigrants, the current poll does have far-ranging policy implications:

1. **A large majority of the Cubans who recently migrated to the United States would welcome changes to U.S./Cuba policy.** Fifty-eight percent of the post-1995 cohort favors lifting the embargo and this proportion is likely to grow as immigration from the island continues at its current pace. More Cubans migrated to the United States during the first ten years of the 21st century than in any previous decade since the revolution. The current split among registered voters on the question of the embargo will become less even as these new arrivals become integrated into the U.S. political system.

2. **Cuban Americans express strong support for policies that increase contact between U.S. citizens, including Cuban Americans, and the Cuban people.** Lifting the restrictions on travel currently in place for non-Cuban-American citizens receives strong backing not only among new arrivals and registered voters (80% and 58%), but also among all age cohorts except the 65 and older group. Similar support is expressed for the continuation of “people-to-people” travel options.
Cuban Americans express strong support for measures that increase commercial relations between U.S. businesses and Cubans on specific ventures. As in previous polls, support for companies selling medicine and food spans all cohorts. Similarly, more than 70% of the respondents would like to see the existing limited business relations between U.S. agricultural providers and the island either expanded or maintained.

Cuban Americans express strong support for maintaining Cuba on the State Department’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Although the support for policies encouraging contact among Americans, Cuban Americans, and Cubans on the island is strong, a large majority of the respondents want to keep the sanctions on the Cuban government imposed by the State Department list. A distinction is frequently made between the people of Cuba and the United States and the governments of Cuba and the United States. Increasing contact between people and maintaining the sanctions provided by the State Department list have one thing in common: both exert pressures for change on the government, at different levels of abstraction from the lives of ordinary people. Increasing direct contact between people has an impact on Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits. Maintaining Cuba on the State Department list does not have that direct a link to the daily lives of the people but sends a strong message to the Cuban state.

Current U.S. immigration policies directed at Cubans receive strong support from Cuban Americans. The unique immigration status of Cubans arriving in the United States receives strong backing from all cohorts, particularly the newer arrivals. The policies associated with the Cuban Adjustment Act and its “wet foot/dry foot” revision have been a focus of debate from both the right and the left in recent years. Clearly these policies have the broad support of those benefiting from them.

Cuban Americans are very likely to vote for candidates who recommend a lifting of the embargo in exchange for other policies that continue to exert pressure on the Cuban government for change. Alternatives to the embargo that increase support for small business owners and human rights pressures receive strong support (58% and 81% respectively). This attitude highlights the view of many respondents of the embargo as a strategic pressure point that could be replaced if other, more timely and appropriate, methods of pressure could be designed.
APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

The FIU Cuba Poll has followed the same methodology over the two decades it has been conducted. Random digit dial (RDD) probability sampling is used to reach households, which are then screened for Cuban residents. No additional screening is done, although in earlier polls selection within the household for age and gender representativeness was done. Recently (including the current poll) the mix of landline and cell numbers makes that unnecessary. The questionnaire is always structured so that tracking questions occur in a similar context of questions asked before them year-to-year.

FIU contracted the services of NORS Surveys, Inc., to conduct telephone interviews among Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County. All calls were made from the NORS Surveys central phone location and were time-coded and maintained on a computer database. For the current poll, 37,766 phone numbers were dialed from RDD probability samples, resulting in 707 cell and 293 landline interviews. Approximately 33% of the calls reached a person in a household and 60% of those households were screened for Cuban residents. A total of 49% of the households identifying as Cuban completed the interview. All interviewers from NORS Surveys in Miami were bilingual, with both English and Spanish questionnaire versions on the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system. A total of 92% of the interviews were completed in Spanish.

Results were weighted by Miami-Dade 2014 American Community Survey (ACS) data on countywide age categories and gender for the Cuban population 18 years and older.

The questionnaire is always structured so that tracking questions occur in a similar context of questions asked before them year-to-year.
# Weight Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex &amp; Age</th>
<th>Sample Proportions</th>
<th>Census Proportions</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men 18-30</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>1.858</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men 31-40</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>1.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 41-50</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>1.569</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men 51-60</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 61-70</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>1.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 70+</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>1.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 18-30</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>1.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 31-40</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.072</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women 41-50</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women 51-60</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.550</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women 61-70</td>
<td>0.150</td>
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<td>0.474</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women 70+</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Type of Interview by Gender and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Cell</th>
<th>Landline</th>
<th>Cell</th>
<th>Landline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Many questions in our survey have been asked exactly the same way for many years. Here is the wording of the questions presented in this report, followed by their Spanish translations. The asterisk (*) signifies questions unique to this survey. All the others have a long history in the FIU Cuba Poll.

**Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not at all? (Figure 1)**

En términos generales, ¿cree usted que el embargo norteamericano a Cuba ha dado muy buen resultado, buen resultado, no muy buen resultado o ningún resultado?

**Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba? (Figure 2)**

¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que continúe el embargo a Cuba?

**Over the years, the United States government has often supported different policies toward Cuba. I am going to read you some of the policies that have been proposed and I would like you to tell me whether you favor or oppose these policies. First, allow companies to sell medicine to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this? (Figure 3)**

Durante años el gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha apoyado a menudo diversas políticas hacia Cuba. Voy a leerle algunas de las políticas que se han propuesto, y me gustaría que usted me dijera si está a favor o en contra de ellas. Permitir que las compañías vendan medicinas a Cuba, ¿está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra o fuertemente en contra?

**Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this? (Figure 3)**

Permitir que las compañías norteamericanas vendan alimentos a Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra o fuertemente en contra?

**Some U.S. companies have managed to establish limited business relations with Cuba to sell grain, other agricultural products, and medicine. Should this kind of trade be expanded, kept the same, or stopped? (Figure 3)**

Algunas compañías en los Estados Unidos han logrado establecer relaciones limitadas para negociar con Cuba, vendiéndole granos, otros productos agrícolas y medicinas. ¿Debería este comercio expandirse, mantenerse igual o suspenderse?

**Do you favor or oppose the U.S. re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba? (Figure 4)**

¿Está usted a favor o en contra del restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos con Cuba?

**Should unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba be allowed or not? (Figure 5)**

Los viajes sin restricciones de todos los americanos a Cuba, ¿deberían ser permitidos o no?

*Currently, all Americans can travel to Cuba in people-to-people trips organized by special travel agencies and designed to encourage communication among citizens of the U.S. and citizens of Cuba. These trips are usually organized for educational, religious, or research purposes. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this type of people-to-people travel? (Figure 6)*

Actualmente, todo norteamericano puede viajar a Cuba por medio de viajes de pueblo a pueblo, organizados por agencias de viaje y diseñados para fomentar la comunicación entre los ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y los ciudadanos de Cuba. Estos viajes se organizan por razones religiosas, educacionales o de investigación. ¿Está usted decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra o fuertemente en contra de este tipo de viaje de pueblo a pueblo?
*Since 1966, the entrance of Cubans into the United States has been regulated by the Cuban Adjustment Act. This law stipulates that Cuban citizens and their accompanying spouses and children may get a green card and become residents of the U.S. one year after arriving in the country. This automatic application process is not usual for other immigrant groups. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose the current policy of accepting Cubans into the U.S.? (Figure 7)

Desde 1966, la entrada de los cubanos a los Estados Unidos ha estado regulada por la Ley de Ajuste Cubano. Esta ley estipula que los ciudadanos cubanos y sus cónyuges e hijos acompañantes pueden obtener una tarjeta verde y convertirse en residentes de los Estados Unidos después de un año de llegar al país. Este proceso de solicitud automática no es usual para otros grupos de inmigrantes. ¿Está usted decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra o fuertemente en contra de la política actual de aceptar a los cubanos en los Estados Unidos?

As it stands, Cubans who leave by raft or boat are sent back to Cuba if they are intercepted before they reach U.S. soil. If they do reach U.S. soil they are allowed to stay in the U.S. Do you agree or disagree with this policy? (Figure 8)

En estos momentos, los cubanos que llegan por balsa o bote son devueltos a Cuba si se les intercepta antes de llegar a territorio norteamericano. Si llegan a territorio norteamericano, se les permite permanecer en los Estados Unidos. ¿Está Ud. de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta política?

*The U.S. Department of State [or U.S. government] includes Cuba on a list of four countries which the U.S. government considers to be State Sponsors of Terrorism. This designation penalizes persons and organizations engaging in certain activities with Cuba and the other countries on the list. The other countries on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Do you believe that Cuba should be kept on that list of penalized countries that support terrorism, or be taken off the list? (Figure 9)

El Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos [o el gobierno de los Estados Unidos] incluye a Cuba en una lista de cuatro países que el gobierno estadounidense considera Estados que Patrocinan el Terrorismo. Esta designación penaliza a las personas que participan en ciertas actividades con Cuba y otros países de la lista. Los otros países de la lista son Irán, Sudán y Siria. ¿Cree usted que a Cuba se le deba mantener en esa lista de países penalizados por patrocinar al terrorismo o debe ser eliminada de la lista?

In political elections, how important is a candidate’s position on Cuba in determining your vote? Would you say it is very important, moderately important, not very important, or not at all important? (Asked only of registered voters) (Figure 10)

En las elecciones políticas, ¿cuán importante es la posición sobre Cuba de un candidato al determinar su voto? ¿Diría usted que es muy importante, moderadamente importante, no muy importante o nada importante?

*How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba? (Figure 11)

¿Cuál es la probabilidad de que usted votara por un candidato que apoye el restablecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con Cuba?

*How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with increased support for independent small business owners in Cuba? (Figure 12)

¿Cuál es la probabilidad de que usted votara por un candidato que apoye reemplazar el embargo con un mayor apoyo a los trabajadores por cuenta propia en Cuba?

*How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with support for increasing pressure on the Cuban government over human rights? (Figure 13)

¿Cuál es la probabilidad de que usted votara por un candidato que apoye reemplazar el embargo con una mayor presión sobre el gobierno cubano en materia de derechos humanos?

Are you registered as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or with some other party? (Figure 16)

¿Está usted inscrito como republicano, demócrata, independiente o con algún otro partido?

*In the past presidential elections, did you vote for Mitt Romney or Barack Obama, or did you not vote for either? (Figure 17)

En la pasada elección presidencial, ¿votó usted por Mitt Romney o Barack Obama o no votó por ninguno de los dos?
About the Cuban Research Institute

FIU’s Cuban Research Institute (CRI) is dedicated to creating and disseminating knowledge about Cuba and Cuban Americans. The institute encourages original research and interdisciplinary teaching, organizes extracurricular activities, collaborates with other academic units working in Cuban and Cuban-American studies, and promotes the development of library holdings and collections on Cuba and its diaspora. Founded in 1991, CRI is the nation’s leading center for research and academic programs on Cuban and Cuban-American issues. No other U.S. university surpasses FIU in the number of professors and students of Cuban origin.

Since its foundation, the institute has generated an exceptional level of scholarship, teaching, and outreach. CRI has organized hundreds of academic and cultural events, covering Cuban and Cuban-American history, politics, society, and the arts. FIU students, faculty, and members of the greater South Florida community are engaged through CRI’s stimulating series of seminars, conferences, lectures, concerts, book presentations, and film screenings. The public events and activities sponsored by the institute are made possible by grants and gifts by private foundations, nonprofit organizations, community members, and the state of Florida.

CRI has received major support from reputable foundations, including Ford, MacArthur, Open Society, Christopher Reynolds, Rockefeller, and Tinker, as well as from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation.
About Florida International University
Florida International University (FIU) is Miami-Dade County’s first public, four-year research university. With more than 50,000 students, 1,000+ full-time faculty members, and nearly 200,000 alumni, FIU is one of South Florida’s anchor institutions and first in the nation in awarding bachelor’s and master’s degrees to Hispanics. FIU offers more than 180 bachelor, master, and doctoral degree programs in its colleges and schools. Recently, the university has achieved several notable milestones, including the establishment of South Florida’s only public College of Medicine and the accreditation of its College of Law.

About the College of Arts & Sciences
As the heart of a leading public research university, the College of Arts & Sciences plays a vital role in the intellectual, cultural, and civic life of local, national, and international communities. The college provides an educational foundation that prepares FIU students to be successful and engaged students in a global society.

About the School of International and Public Affairs
The School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) brings together many of FIU’s internationally oriented disciplines to provide cutting-edge research, first-rate teaching, and innovative training necessary for the globalized world of the 21st century. SIPA includes eight signature departments: Criminal Justice, Economics, Global and Sociocultural Studies, History, Modern Languages, Politics and International Relations, Public Administration, and Religious Studies. The school also houses many of the university’s most prominent international centers, institutes, and programs.