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CUBA POLL 2024

How Cuban Americans in South Florida View
U.S. Policies towards Cuba, Critical National
Issues and the Upcoming Elections

FIU | Steven J. Green
School of International
& Public Affairs
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

**THE 2024
FIU CUBA POLL**

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SOUTH FLORIDA
VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS CUBA,
CRITICAL NATIONAL ISSUES AND THE
UPCOMING ELECTIONS**

**Guillermo J. Grenier, Ph.D.
Qing Lai, Ph.D.**

Cuban Research Institute



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FOREWORD

The U.S./Cuba policy shifts initiated by President Obama in 2014, when President Biden held the office of Vice President, have all but disappeared and the familiar hostilities, dating to the Cold War period, continue to dominate relations between the United States and Cuba. The winds of engagement which unfurled the Obama initiatives have been replaced by the doldrums of indecision and ambiguity. Not much has changed in the narrative shaping U.S./Cuba policy during the administration of President Joseph R. Biden.

Four FIU Cuba Polls have been conducted since Donald Trump first appeared on the ballot for President of the United States in 2016. In the foreword of the previous Cuba polls, we predicted that the intensification of the isolationist policies would likely be reflected in the community as attitudes tend to adjust to the policy frameworks established by the leadership in Washington. We were not mistaken. Relations between the United States and Cuba since the last Cuba Poll in 2022, have not followed the path of engagement. While the Cuban American community supports a few pro-engagement policies, the overall tendency is to support sanctions and isolation for the island.

The findings of the poll indicate a continued retrenchment of traditional hard-line views towards U.S.-Cuban relations. While support for the embargo has decreased slightly since the last poll in 2022, the mood of the community remains one of adherence to the policies designed to isolate the Cuban government. The collateral damage inflicted on the Cuban people is only partially mitigated by the continued support of policies which increase or maintain contacts between families and friends in the diaspora and on the island.

The demographics of the Cuban American community in South Florida continue to change while many of its attitudes directed at the state-to-state relations between the U.S. and their homeland remain laden with contradictions. The second and third generation of Cuban Americans are driving the hope for engagement while more established residents insist on a tougher stand.

As researchers, we owe much to the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs. Without the generous financial and moral support of the School and its Dean, Dr. Shlomi Dinar, our job would be much harder than to simply be the messengers of the current state of Cuban American political culture in South Florida. We would also like to acknowledge the collaboration of other members of the Green School community in this endeavor. Thank you, Dr. Jeff Gonzalez, Associate Dean, for your unwavering support of our work; thank you Dr. Jorge Duany for always insisting nothing short of perfection in our design and methodology; and thank you Pedro Botta and Todd Ellenberg for shepherding this project to the finish line.

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THE RESEARCHERS



Guillermo J. Grenier

Guillermo J. Grenier is professor of sociology in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. Born in Havana, Cuba, Dr. Grenier is one of the founders of the Miami school of social analysis and has authored or coauthored seven books and dozens of articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation, and Cuban-American ideological profiles, particularly in the Greater Miami Area. His books include *A History of Little Havana*, with Corinna J. Moebius (2015); *This Land is Our Land: Newcomers and Established Residents in Miami*, with Alex Stepick, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn (2003); *The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States*, with Lisandro Pérez (2002); *Newcomers in the Workplace: Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. Economy*, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick (1994); and *Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change*, edited with Alex Stepick (1992). Dr. Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a Faculty Fellow of the University of Notre Dame's Institute of Latino Research, as well as director of the Florida Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures nationally and internationally on his research. He received his Ph.D. in sociology and his M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.



Qing Lai

Qing Lai is an associate professor of sociology at the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. He earned his Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Michigan, where he received training at the Institute for Social Research's Population Studies Center and Survey Research Center. His research interests include social demography and survey research. Dr. Lai has published peer-reviewed articles in *Social Science Research*, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *Chinese Sociological Review*, *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, *Research in the Sociology of Work*, *Natural Hazards*, and *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS)*. He joined the FIU Cuba Poll project in 2020 as co-PI. He has also participated in survey research projects on various communities, including the *Xidaotang* Islamic sect in Gansu, Chinese Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, *Dungan* Muslims in Central Asia, and the homeless in Miami-Dade County.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This year the FIU Cuba Poll asked 1,001 Cuban Americans in South Florida about their perspectives on U.S./Cuba relations and other topics which provide insights into how the population views the relationship between the Cuban diaspora and the island. Being an election year, we also asked about their voting preferences and the national issues which they consider to be the most significant. Our findings reveal important differences in perspectives across party affiliation as well as age and migration cohort.

Party Affiliation and Anticipated Voting Behavior

- Approximately 54% of Cuban Americans are registered Republicans. Republicans make up a majority of all age migration groups. Non-Cuba born Cuban Americans, however, spread their political affiliation among the three categories relatively evenly. **(Figure 34)**
- Similarly, a majority of the youngest cohort (<40) register as either Independents (29%) or Democrats (24%). **(Figure 34)**
- The Democratic Party has made little headway into the Cuban American community since its high point during the Obama administration but neither has the Republican party surged to reach the registered voter dominance it experienced before the Obama years. The No Party Affiliation registrations, however, have maintained an influential presence on the political landscape in South Florida during the past decade. **(See Appendix 2, Figure 42).**

The Senate Race

- The Senate race is not a tight one among Cuban American likely voters. Senator Rick Scott continues to receive the support of most Cuban Americans (50%) while Representative Debbie Mucarsel-Powell manages to gather 19% of the potential voters. **(Figure 36)**
- Both registered Democrats and Republicans hold the party line with 67% of each group supporting its candidate. **(Figure 36)**
- Thirty five percent of independents report supporting Senator Scott and 18% support Representative Mucarsel-Powell. **(Figure 36)**
- There is a significant number of undecided voters still on the fence (22%). **(Figure 36)**

The Race for President

- The support for Donald Trump among Cuban Americans is strong. Approximately 68% of respondents expect to cast their ballot for Trump in the upcoming election. Twenty-three percent support Vice President Harris, and a modest 5% remain undecided. **(Figure 37)**
- Cuban Americans not born on the island are the only bright spot for Vice President Harris: 44% report that they will vote for her (46% support Trump.) **(Figure 37)**

Key Characteristics of Harris and Trump Supporters (See Appendix 4)

- There are important differences between the voters who are supporting Vice President Harris and those supporting Donald Trump.
 - Demographically, Harris supporters are younger (mean: 48 years old vs 53 years old), over 58% female (vs 48%), have more years of formal education (63% vs 46% college educated).
 - Interestingly 80% of married Trump supporters have a Cuban spouse while only 60% of Harris voters have Cuban spouses.
- See **Appendix 4** for tables contrasting the policy preference and demographic characteristics of the two voting blocks.

The Performance of the Current Administration Underwhelms Cuban-Americans

- The majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida give the current administration poor marks on many key issues facing the country. **(Figures 27-31)**
 - Only 27% of those expressing a point of view support the administration's handling of U.S./Cuba policy.
 - The administration's performance in controlling inflation also receives a 27% approval rating. Democrats (74% support) and newest arrivals (62% support) offer a more encouraging appraisal.
 - A similar lack of support is expressed towards the administration's handling of relations with China (29% support), Russia (29%), the conflict between Ukraine and Russia (34%), and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict (34%). In all of these issues, Democrats are the only group with a majority supporting the administration's work.
- There is one policy initiative which receives strong support from Cuban Americans across party affiliation. Overwhelmingly, Cuban Americans support the Humanitarian Visa program initiated by the Biden administration in 2023 (72%). **(Figure 16)**

Cuban Americans Prioritize National Issues Much Like Other Americans, but Generational and Party Differences Exist

- The economy clearly ranks as the most important policy concern among respondents of all **age** categories EXCEPT the oldest. The over-76 category of respondents considers access to health care almost as important as the economy. **(Figure 24)**
- The top three issues, when one looks at the entire sample as well as within each **age** cohort, are the economy, health care, and immigration. **(Figure 24)**
- Cuba policy is ranked sixth by the entire sample and the subgroups but the 76+ **age** group elevates Cuba policy to fourth, tied with the issue of controlling the sale of assault weapons. **(Figure 24)**
- When we dissect the results along the lines of **party affiliation**, different agendas are evident.
 - Health care is considered the most important issue among Democrats and non-citizens (tied with the economy for the latter group).
 - Democrats also give greater importance to abortion rights (2nd place), gun control (4th place), and race relations (5th place) than do Republicans. **(Figure 26)**
- Cuba policy landed in sixth place among Republicans and seventh place among Independents and non-citizens but drops to 8th place in importance among Democrats. **(Figure 26)**

On U.S. Cuba Policy, Party and Generations Differ

- Regarding U.S./Cuba policy, Republicans are doubling down on the isolationist approach while Democrats are less insistent on isolation.
 - Approximately 65% of Republicans favor the continuation of the embargo (25% of Democrats), and 65% oppose unrestricted travel by all Americans (25% of Democrats).
 - In the general population, continuing the embargo gathers the support of 55% of the population while 51% oppose unrestricted travel for all American citizens. **(Figures 5 and 17)**
- A slight minority (47%) of the youngest group (<40 years of age) support continuation of the embargo while all other age categories surpass the 50% level of support. **(Figures 5)**
- The youngest cohort, non-citizens, the newest arrivals, and the Cuban Americans not born in Cuba are the most likely to support unrestricted travel by all Americans. **(Figures 17)**


Political Party and Age also Condition the Support for the Emerging Private Sector in Cuba

- While a minority of Cuban Americans agree with allowing U.S. residents to invest in the emerging independent business sector in Cuba (34%), half of the 40-and-under group support what would be a significant policy innovation (49%). **(Figure 11)**
- Democrats are considerably more bullish on investing on the island. Approximately 64% endorse a policy allowing for investment in small, independent businesses. Only 21% of Republicans support such a policy. About 37% of Independents view this as a policy worth pursuing. **(Figure 11)**
- When asked whether small business owners on the island who have no connection to the Cuban Communist Party should be allowed to open bank accounts in the United States, a sizable minority of the entire sample thought this was a good idea (42%). Age cohorts differed, however, with the youngest cohort expressing more enthusiasm for the policy (49%) as did the newest arrivals (67%). **(Figure 12)**
- Party affiliation established a more distinguishable demarcation on this policy initiative. Seventy percent of Democrats are of the opinion that small business owners on the island should be allowed to use the U.S. banking system; this is more than double the number of Republicans that hold that opinion (32%). **(Figure 12)**
- When asked if a Republican candidate who endorsed policies to assist independent Cuban businesses would gain their support, 45% of Cuban Americans said that such a candidate would be likely to receive their support. **(Figure 13)**
- When the question was asked about a Democratic candidate, 35% of the entire sample voiced support. But party affiliation matters.
 - Forty-eight percent of Republicans would support a Republican with such an initiative, while only 20% would support a Democrat with the same idea.
 - Similarly, 70% of Democrats would support a Democrat who proposed to assist small businesses in Cuba while 34% would support a Republican with the same agenda.
 - Democrats seem more likely to cross party lines for a Republican than vice versa. **(Figure 14)**

Contextualizing the Cuban American Population

Most of the Cuban Americans in the United States live in Florida, and most of the Cuban American in Florida reside in the South Florida region. As a result, Cuban Americans make up a miniscule percentage of the national population but dominate the demographic landscape of Miami-Dade County. Their overwhelming presence in Florida makes their political involvement critically important, particularly during presidential election years.

Figure 1: National Population Estimates: Cubans, Other Hispanics, Non-Hispanics



Key Characteristics of the Cuban American Population in Miami-Dade County

As Table 1 shows, the methodology utilized to conduct the 2024 FIU Cuba Poll has resulted in a representative sample of the Cuban American population in South Florida along multiple dimensions. The weighted percentages of our sample reflect the estimates established by the Census Bureau in its 2018-2022 5-year sample of the American Community Survey. Overall, we achieve an excellent representation of the demographics of the Cuban American population in Miami-Dade County. (See **Appendix 1: Notes on Methodology**)

Table 1. Adult Cuban American population in Miami-Dade County, 2024

	ACS	Cuba Poll (weighted)*
Nativity & immigrant cohort		
<i>Born in Cuba</i>		
<i>Migrated before 1995</i>	31.0	31.1
<i>Migrated in 1995-2019</i>	47.2	47.3
<i>Migrated in 2020-present year**</i>	1.1	1.0
<i>Born in the United States</i>	18.3	18.4
<i>Born in other countries</i>	2.4	2.2
Age group		
18-39	27.3	30.0
40-59	35.0	37.2
60-75	22.7	20.6
75 or older	15.0	12.2
Gender		
Male	48.9	49.0
Female	51.1	51.0
Race		
White	49.4	72.5
Black	1.1	1.7
Other	4.4	25.8
Two or more races	45.1	N/A
Years of education	12.7 (3.5)	14.7 (2.7)

Note: *The Cuba Poll results are weighted toward the ACS weighted population structure using a four-way weight based on nativity, immigrant cohort, age, and gender.

**Though new immigrants in 2020-2024 account for 4.6% of our Cuba-born respondents, the ACS 2018-2022 5-year sample underestimates immigrants in more recent years.

Sources: 2024 FIU Cuba Poll; American Community Survey 2018-2022 5-year sample.

Voter Registration Estimates for Cuban Americans in Florida and Miami-Dade County

Table 2 presents our estimate of the current number of registered Cuban Americans by party affiliation in Florida and Miami-Dade County. These numbers become relevant when voting preferences are disclosed. The figures that follow the table highlight the dominance of the Republican Party in Cuban American political life at the state and the county levels.

Table 2. Estimated number of registered Cuban American voters by party, Florida and Miami-Dade County

	Florida			Miami-Dade		
	All*	Hispanic***	Cuban****	All*	Hispanic**	Cuban****
Republican	5,455,480	755,461	389,388	475,443	359,539	277,862
Democrat	4,400,561	773,642	124,850	519,517	227,100	89,091
Other	3,989,872	939,839	192,327	512,549	328,745	137,242
Total registered	13,845,913	2,468,942	706,565	1,507,509	915,384	504,196


Notes: * Official state voter registration statistics as of September 30, 2024, retrieved on October 16, 2024.

** Official MDC voter registration statistics as of October 1, 2024, retrieved on October 16, 2024.


*** Official state voter registration statistics as of July 22, 2024, retrieved on October 16, 2024.

**** Cuban estimates are based on American Community Survey 2018-2022 5-year sample, 2024 Cuba Poll, and official voter registration statistics.

**Figure 2: Estimated Florida Voter Registration
(by Party and Ethnicity)**



**Figure 3: Estimated Voter Registration by Party: Miami-Dade County
(By Cuban/Hispanic/Non-Hispanic)**



MAIN FINDINGS

This section presents the responses to key questions of the poll. The exact wording for selected questions, along with the Spanish version, is included in Appendix 3.

Cuban Americans and U.S./Cuba Relations

The Biden administration did not prioritize the development of a cohesive approach to U.S./Cuba relations during its four years at the helm. Little differentiated the Biden Cuba policy from the isolationist vision implemented by former President Donald Trump. A fairly benevolent Humanitarian Parole Program initiated in January 2023 has been hampered by slow implementation, and the late-in-the-game statements supporting the use of U.S. banks by Cuban entrepreneurs has had little impact on strengthening the emerging private sector on the island. While diplomatic relations remain firmly in place, diplomacy has made little headway.

A catastrophic economic situation combined with the Cuban government's inability to establish and communicate a strategic plan to improve conditions has spurred the continuing migration of mostly young Cubans to the United States. Over 200,000 Cubans have come into Miami-Dade and Broward Counties since 2022. These new arrivals are learning about the American political system at a moment of extreme polarization and conflict. Those arriving in South Florida are being socialized into a political culture that understands their resentment of the Cuban government and translates this resentment into an acceptance of an isolationist approach to U.S./Cuba relations and a political allegiance to the Republican party. There are exceptions, of course, but the overwhelming pressure on new arrivals is to integrate into a deeply polarized political landscape.

It is in this climate that our respondents express their views in this 2024 edition of the FIU Cuba Poll. The main findings of the poll follow.


In this brief report, we present the sample distributions of selected variables as well as their conditional distributions by age, migration/nativity, and voter registration/party. All results are weighted to represent the current (2024) Cuban American population aged 18 or older in Miami-Dade County. In the brief discussions associated with the self-explanatory charts, we sometimes highlight the opinions expressed by the entire sample and mention categories that diverge from the general opinion of the community. The Cuban American community is not monolithic in its attitudes, even when certain tendencies prevail.

The Embargo

Approximately 75% of Cuban Americans living in South Florida believe that the embargo has not worked.

Since the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll in the early 1990s, most Cuban Americans in South Florida have agreed that the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba has not worked. We do not ask directly about the conditions necessary for the respondents to consider the embargo a “success,” so each respondent is free to evaluate success/failure in their own terms.


Figure 4



A majority of the Cuban American community supports the continuation of the embargo.

Despite a decline since the 2022 measurement, approximately 55% of the Cuban American community supports, either strongly favor or mostly favor, the continuation of the U.S. embargo on the island when “Don’t Know” is considered a response. Anti-embargo sentiments dominate only in the cohorts of those born outside of the island (42% support) and those reporting to be registered Democrats (28% support.)

Figure 5



Other Economic Relationships

A majority of Cuban Americans support the sale of food and medical products to Cuba by U.S. companies.

Despite the strong support for the economic embargo, most Cuban Americans in South Florida remain concerned about the welfare of their fellow Cubans remaining on the island. This is clearly expressed in the overwhelming support for the exportation of food (**Fig 6**) and medicine (**Fig 7**) to the island.

When respondents are asked if they support the sale of medicine or food by U.S. companies to Cuba in an “unrestricted way,” food exports by U.S. companies are supported by 64% of the sample and the export of medicine is endorsed by 72% of respondents.

Figure 6





Figure 7




The Politics of the Carrot and the Policy of the Stick

Should Cuba remain on the list of countries supporting terrorism? Most say, “yes.”

A vast majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida (68%) are of the opinion that Cuba should remain on the State Department’s list of countries which support terrorist activities. The exception to this view is presented by the generation of Cubans born outside of Cuba, the newest youngest cohort (to some degree) and those that are registered as Democrats.

Figure 8




On the Carrot and the Stick

Since the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll in the 1990s, the desire to wield a punishing stick on the Cuban government while simultaneously extending some kind of conciliatory carrot has been present in the community’s attitudes toward U.S./Cuba relations.

Offering the carrot: a majority support policies directed specifically at improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people.

Respondents are enthusiastic about policies designed to improve the well-being of the Cuban people. Strong support is expressed for these “softer” political approaches (54%). Only registered Republicans express opposition (55%) to these kinds of policies.


Figure 9



Wielding the stick: a majority of respondents also support policies designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote political change with equal enthusiasm.

Seventy-two percent of respondents approved of policies designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban government in order to promote regime change. All categories of respondents expressed overwhelming support for hard-line policies.

Figure 10




On Assisting the Small Business Enterprises on the Island

The emergence of small businesses on the island could present the Cuban American community with a choice: to invest or not to invest in the growing private sector.

When asked if they favored a policy which would allow people living in the United States to invest in the Cuban small private business sector, only a third of the sample (33%) expressed support. The exceptions to this significant opposition were Democrats (64% in support), respondents not born on the island (53% in support), and the under 40 years of age cohort (49% in support).


Figure 11



But if small business owners are certifiably not involved with the Cuban Communist Party, would you allow them to utilize U.S. banks to conduct their business?

While still supported by a minority (39%) of respondents, support increased for the participation of small business owners who have no connection to the Communist Party to utilize U.S. banks – by a significant amount among the population as a whole, as well as among Democrats (70% support.)

Figure 12



When asked whether they would stand behind a Republican or Democratic candidate who supports policies assisting the private sector on the island while maintaining the embargo, some Cuban Americans expressed a willingness to step across party lines to support such a candidate.

Figure 13 presents the results when we asked about supporting a Republican candidate who would implement policies to assist independently owned businesses on the island while maintaining the embargo on the Cuban government and in **Figure 14** we see the responses when the question is asked about a Democratic candidate.

Approximately 46% of the entire sample would support a Republican candidate with a pro-small business agenda with the strongest support expressed by the less-than-60 age group and the post-1995 migration group.

About half of registered Republicans (53%) are willing to lend their support to a fellow Republican with this agenda and 38% of Democrats would cross party lines to endorse such a candidate.

When the question was asked about a Democratic candidate proposing such policies, support of the total sample declines (32%), and only 18% of Republicans express a willingness to support a Democrat who proposed such policies. Support declined among the other categories of respondents as well.

Figure 13






Figure 14



On the issue of maintaining diplomatic relations

Since Obama re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba, Cuban Americans have remained steadfast in supporting the new era in U.S./Cuba relations. There has been a steady retrenching of support for the policy since 2018, however, when 67% expressed support for the maintenance of diplomatic relations, as contrasted with the 50% support this year within the overall sample. What has become the diplomatic status quo is opposed by those migrating before 1995, the oldest cohorts and registered Republicans.


Figure 15



Strong support for the Humanitarian Parole Program established by the Biden administration in January 2023.

Despite their ambivalent views on the maintenance of diplomatic relations, a near-consensus exists among Cuban Americans supporting policies which assist the entrance of Cubans into the country. Seventy-two percent of respondents support the provision of humanitarian parole permitting the sponsorship of Cuban nationals by Cuban Americans. (Figure 16)


Figure 16



Support for allowing all Americans unrestricted travel to the island remains split.

For the third consecutive poll, the Cuban American community in South Florida is split on its support for a policy allowing unrestricted travel by all Americans to the island. Forty-seven percent of respondents expressed support for allowing all Americans to travel to the island, a figure slightly higher than the one recorded in the 2022 Poll (45%). While the oldest migration cohort and Republicans express strong opposition to unrestricted travel, other age and migration cohorts are more supportive of unrestricted travel.


Figure 17



A large majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida have relatives or significant others living in Cuba.

The South Florida Cuban American community has the characteristics of a true transnational diaspora. Many families on the island have experienced the migration of one or more of their members. Approximately 66% of Cubans living in South Florida have relatives living in Cuba. Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of those who migrated since 1995 have relatives left behind.


Figure 18



Many of the remaining relatives will eventually be our neighbors.

About half of Cubans who have relatives on the island plan to bring them over at some point. Fifty-one percent of Cubans in South Florida with relatives on the island indicate that family reunification is on their minds.


Figure 19



Have you traveled to Cuba?

Over half of the respondents (52%) report traveling to the island at some point. The post-1995 migrants are the most frequent travelers. Twenty-nine percent of Cuban Americans born outside of the island have made the journey to their parents' homeland.


Figure 20



Almost half of Cuban Americans send remittances to family members on the island.

Cubans in South Florida continue to send remittances to friends and relatives. Approximately 42% of Cuban American families send remittances to relatives in Cuba. The most recent arrivals, particularly those here categorized as non-citizens, are the most likely to send remittances while the older population group and the pre-1995 migrants are the least likely to do so.


Figure 21



Let's Talk Baseball Diplomacy

As many of us know, the Major League Baseball organization in the United States has arrangements with baseball officials in many countries so that players from those countries can have an orderly and safe way to play professional baseball in the U.S. We asked respondents if they felt that U.S. Major League Baseball should be able to negotiate similar arrangements with Cuba so that Cuban baseball players can play professional baseball in the United States without first having to defect. Fifty two percent of the respondents said “yes.” The support was widespread, although the young respondents, new arrivals, and non-Cuba born were the most enthusiastic. But even the 60-75 age group supported the possibility.

Figure 22




On Political Persuasion and National Issues

Yes, Cubans are still conservative.

Most Cuban Americans consider themselves to be on the conservative side of political ideology. When asked to place their political views on a scale where 1 is extremely conservative and 7 is extremely liberal, only Democrats cross into what might be called the “liberal” dimension of the ideological scale. Non-citizens and the most recent arrivals (overlapping groups) consider themselves more “liberal” than the general population.

Figure 23



The importance of selected policies to Cuban Americans in South Florida


The economy, health care, immigration, Cuba policies, gun control, Russia, China, race relations, abortion rights, Israeli/Palestinian conflict

Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of selected social and international issues on a scale of 1-5. Each policy was presented independently. Respondents were not forced to prioritize the policies compared to each other, simply to rank the policy’s importance on a five-point scale. The results present a clear picture of the importance of each policy. Combining the answers allows us to evaluate how the Cuban American community prioritizes them. Let us look at the importance of each policy to the respondents, categorized by age, migration period, and party registration.

Importance of Selected Issues by Age

The economy clearly ranks as the most important policy concern among all respondent categories EXCEPT the oldest. The over-76 category of respondents considers access to health care almost as important as the economy. The top three issues among the entire sample as well as within each age cohort are the economy, health care, and immigration. Cuba policy is ranked sixth by the entire sample and the subgroups, but the 76+ group elevates Cuba policy to fourth, tied with the issue of controlling the sale of assault weapons.


Figure 24



Importance of Selected Issues by Migration Period

Regardless of when the respondents left Cuba, the economy, access to health care, and immigration remain the most important issues facing Cuban Americans in South Florida. The importance of Cuba policy remains in sixth place for most of the pre-1995 and the 1995-2019 migrants but rises to rank fifth for the newest arrivals and drops to seventh among the non-Cuba-born. The right to have access to safe and legal abortions is significantly more important to the Cuban Americans not born in Cuba but remains relatively low in ranking.


Figure 25



Importance of Selected Issues by Party Affiliation

When we dissect the results along the lines of party affiliation, different agendas are evident. Health care is considered the most important issue among Democrats and non-citizens (tied with the economy for the latter group). Democrats also give greater importance to abortion rights (2nd place), gun control (4th place), and race relations (5th place) than do Republicans. Cuba policy is ranked in sixth place by Republicans and in seventh place among Independents and non-citizens but drops to eighth place in importance among Democrats.

Figure 26




Approval for the Current Administration's Handling of Key International Issues

The current administration receives little support for its handling of U.S./Cuba policy.

Cuban Americans, in general, are underwhelmed by the way that the current administration has handled U.S./Cuba policy. Only 33% of those expressing a point of view support the administration's handling of the issue. The most recent arrivals and registered Democrats are the only two categories which express majority support. It is impossible to tell from the responses exactly how Cuban Americans disagree with Biden's approach (too pro-engagement or too isolationist), but it is fairly clear that the handling of the Cuba issue managed to displease almost everyone in the Cuban American community.


Figure 27



The administration receives little support for its handling of U.S./China policy.

The respondents express slightly more support for the administration’s handling of U.S./China policy than for his handling of Cuba policy. Approximately 30% approve of his China policy. Again, we find Democrats and the newest arrivals to be the most supportive.


Figure 28



The administration doesn't get better marks for handling U.S./Russia relations.

The Biden administration does not improve its foreign policy approval rating as we work our way along the alphabet. A mere 25% percent of Cuban Americans support his handling of Russia policy. The lack of support is spread evenly across all the categories of respondents. Registered Democrats, however, stand by their man once more.


Figure 29



The administration gets lukewarm support for its handling of the Ukraine crisis.

Thirty-four percent of respondents support the administration’s handling of the Ukraine crisis. Only the cohort of registered Democrats express majority support for Biden on this issue.


Figure 30



The administration gets little support for its handling of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

On this issue, the administration lost even its usually stalwart Cuban American democratic base. Only 44% of Democrats support Biden’s handling of the conflict, although we cannot assume that the Democratic malcontent has the same source as that of the Republican (30% support) or the Independent (36% support) voters.

Figure 31



What to Expect in November

High citizenship and voter participation is a characteristic of the Cuban American population.

The literature on Cuban Americans highlights their political engagement. Our sample lives up to expectations. Ninety two percent of our sample report being citizens and 98% report either being registered voters or the intention to register before the deadline. **(Figures 32 and 33)** Of this group, 96% report that they will definitely or probably vote in November. This engagement with the voting process is reflected in all respondent categories. **(Figure 34)**

Figure 32




Figure 33






Figure 34



The Republican Party is the party of choice of a majority of registered voters.

The ranks of the Republican Party are well represented by the Cuba-born members of all migration waves. The non-Cuba born registered voters, however, spread their political affiliation among the three categories relatively evenly. Similarly, a majority of the youngest cohort (<40) register as either Independents (29%) or Democrats (24%). The Democratic Party has made little headway into the Cuban American community since its high point during the Obama administration, but neither has the Republican party surged to reach the dominance it experienced before the Obama years. The No Party Affiliation registrations, however, have maintained an influential presence on the political landscape in South Florida during the past decade. (see **Trends in Appendix 2**).

Figure 35




The Horseraces

If the election for U.S. senator were held today, who would you vote for: Rick Scott or Debbie Mucarsel-Powell? Senator Scott by “un burujón”

Florida now has over a million more registered Republicans than Democrats. Any statewide race, then, should favor Republicans if the two parties turn out their members in equal numbers and the Independents split their vote. With keen eyes, analysts will look closely at the “Cuban vote” and weigh its importance in the election since most Cubans turn out to vote and are mostly Republicans.

Our poll completed its interviewing in mid-October. It is not a risky proposition to call the Cuban American vote for Senator Scott. In a close statewide race, however, the 22% undecided voters could have an impact. The Democrats will also do well among the Cuban Americans not born on the island and among the youngest voters.

Figure 36




On the 2024 Presidential Race

If the presidential election were held today, who would you vote for: Donald Trump or Kamala Harris?

This entire report should have served as a huge “spoiler alert” to the reader about the answer to this question. The Trump train is still picking up passengers on Calle Ocho. The majority of the Cuban American registered voters report that they will cast their vote for Donald Trump (68%). While Vice President Harris supporters are in the minority, they represent the majority of Democrats and a sizable minority of Cuban Americans not born on the island.

The support for Donald Trump seems to have increased since he was last on the ballot in 2020. We concluded the data gathering process for the 2020 poll nearly two months prior to the election. The resulting tabulations reported a 59% voter preference for Donald Trump. It also reported a relatively high percentage of undecided (15%). The reported totals for this report (2024) are a result of a data gathering process which ended in mid-October. The undecided voter percentage is a more modest 5%. These factors may help to explain a portion of the increase in support at the level of polling accuracy, but they say nothing about the political resilience of Mr. Trump.

Figure 37



A Final Word on the Influence of the Influencers


The international phenomenon of “influencers” has lost its novelty and now has become part of the media industrial complex. Cuban Americans, particularly the young ones, are as familiar with influencers and other social media personalities as older Americans are familiar with Anderson Cooper or as previous generations were familiar with Peter Jennings and Walter Cronkite. Influencers are a source of news and information as well as entertainment. Using platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, the voices of these mostly young, tech-savvy media entrepreneurs often carry political messages to their growing audiences.

We asked our respondents about their sources of news and information about Cuba. Approximately 36% of the entire sample mentioned that they received information from social media sources.

A clear generational and migration wave differentiation is evident in **Figure 38**. While only 11% of the oldest respondents report receiving information about Cuba from

social media sources, 52% of the youngest signal this as their main source of information. The overall panorama of social media serving Cuba related information to our community has not changed much from the [2022 Cuba Poll](#) but one pattern seems to be emerging. The newest arrivals increasingly use social media to receive information about Cuba (56%).


Figure 38



Do you get your information from specific social media personalities broadcasting through Youtube, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, or other platforms?

While the world of social media influencers is immense and changing consistently, we wanted to know if our respondents tune in to specific personalities for their information on Cuba. Forty-four percent of the total sample claims to receive information about Cuba from some social media personality and a majority of migrants arriving after 1995 do so. Interestingly, approximately 50% of Republicans tune in to social media personalities for information about Cuba, but only 37% of Democrats and 41% of Independents do so.


Figure 39



How much do “influencers” influence?

Figure 40 charts the influence exerted by “influencers” on the political thinking of respondents who receive information from social media personalities. Fifty percent deny being influenced by the political messages of social media personalities. But as the graph makes clear, most Cuban Americans, except the 76+ generation, seem to recognize that social media personalities exert some sort of influence—little, some or strong—over their political thinking. **Appendix 4c** distributes the voters according to their preferred presidential candidate. Thirty-eight percent of Trump supporters and 22% of Harris supporters claim that social media personalities have a some/strong influence on their political thinking.

Figure 40



More research needs to be conducted to enhance our understanding of the relationship between influencers and the nature of the political culture of Cuban Americans. Do influencers exert their influence by amplifying existing opinions? Do they shape/create opinions? Do they have an impact on other political behavior, such as voting or political party affiliation? Inquiring minds want to know.

Appendix 1: Notes on Methodology

Following the methodology used in previous surveys, the 2024 FIU Cuba Poll is the latest telephone survey of Cuban American residents in South Florida. The intended population includes all self-identified Cuban adults (aged 18 or older) who currently live in Miami-Dade County (MDC). The sampling frame consists of all Telephone Consumer Protection Act compliant LAN and cell numbers operating in the area. A probability sample was constructed using Random Digit Dialing (RDD) procedure. FIU contracted the NORS Surveys, Inc. to conduct the interviews. The respondents who self-identified as Cuban were interviewed with our bilingual (English and Spanish) questionnaire and the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system.

Data collection took place between September 25 and October 9, 2024. A total of 101,207 phone calls were made, among whom 21,074 refused to participate, and an additional 5,874 respondents were not of Cuban origin. Our final sample contains 1,001 eligible respondents. A majority (75.7%) of the sample completed the interviews via cell phone, and 38.7% of the interviews were conducted in Spanish.

All results presented in this report are weighted to better represent the intended population. A four-way weight is constructed using gender, age, country of birth, and the year of migration (if born in Cuba). Our population benchmark is the person-weighted American Community Survey (ACS) 2018-2022 5-year sample.


All figures in this report are graphed using precise values, but most percentages are rounded to integers for visual clarity. As a result, the distributional percentages in a few figures do not add up to 100 due to rounding error.

Table 2 presents the estimated number of Cuban American registered voters by party. Two assumptions were made. First, the registration rate is assumed to be the same for all Hispanic communities (74.1% for Florida and 86.3% for MDC). Second, the state-level party distribution of Cuban American registered voters is assumed to be the same as that in Miami-Dade County. Figures 2 and 3 are also built upon these assumptions.

Appendix 2: Selected Trends


Support for the Embargo and Diplomatic Relations Over Time (2007-2024)

Figure 41



Party Affiliation Over time (2007-2024)

Figure 42



Appendix 3: Selected Questions

Over the years, the United States government has often supported different policies toward Cuba. I am going to read you some of the policies that have been proposed and I would like you to tell me whether you favor or oppose these policies.

1. **First, allow companies to sell medicine in an unrestricted way to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?** *[Esta es una pregunta sobre Cuba actualmente.] Durante años el gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha apoyado a menudo diversas políticas hacia Cuba. Voy a leerle algunas de las políticas que se han propuesto, y me gustaría que usted me dijera si está a favor o en contra de ellas. Permitir que las compañías vendan medicinas a Cuba, ¿está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?*
2. **Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba in an unrestricted way. [..Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose this?]** *Permitir que las compañías norteamericanas vendan alimentos a Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?*
3. **Allowing unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose?** *Los viajes sin restricciones de todos los americanos a Cuba ¿deberían ser permitidos o no?*
4. **Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not at all?** *En términos generales, ¿cree usted que el embargo norteamericano a Cuba ha dado muy buen resultado, buen resultado, no muy buen resultado, o ningún resultado?*
5. **On the issue of the embargo, Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba?** *¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que continúe el embargo a Cuba?*
6. **On the issue of maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba, do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba?** *¿Está usted a favor o en contra del restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos con Cuba?*
7. **Do you or your family in Miami send money back to Cuba?** *¿Me podría decir si usted o algún miembro de su familia envía dinero a Cuba?*
8. **Some people say that the U.S. government should emphasize policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote regime change. Other people say that the U.S. government should emphasize policies that directly help the Cuban people improve their economic well being. Thinking now about the policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban Government, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy approach?** *Algunas personas dicen que el gobierno de los EE. UU. debe enfatizar las políticas que ejercen la máxima presión sobre el gobierno cubano para promover el cambio de régimen. Otras personas dicen que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos debe enfatizar las políticas que ayudan directamente al pueblo cubano a mejorar su bienestar económico. Pensando ahora en las políticas que ejercen la máxima presión sobre el gobierno cubano, ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con este enfoque de política?*
9. **Now Thinking now about the policies that are directed specifically at improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy approach?** *Pensando ahora en las políticas que se dirigen específicamente a mejorar el bienestar económico del pueblo cubano, ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con este enfoque político?*
10. **The United State Department of State includes Cuba on a list four countries considered to be State Sponsors of Terrorism. Cuba along with Iran, Sudan and Syria are on the list. Do you believe that Cuba should be on that list?** *El Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos incluye a Cuba en una lista de cuatro países considerados como patrocinadores del terrorismo. Cuba junto con Irán, Sudán y Siria están en la lista. ¿Cree que Cuba debería estar en esa lista*

Appendix 4a: Voter Demographic Profiles by Presidential Candidates

	Harris	Trump	DK	Total
Age	47.8	53.2	51.2	51.6
Migration cohort (%)				
<i><1995</i>	28.7	36.2	33.0	33.6
<i>1995-2019</i>	30.8	49.2	46.9	44.9
<i>Not Cuba-born</i>	40.5	14.6	20.1	21.5
Gender (%)				
<i>Male</i>	41.8	51.4	31.0	47.9
<i>Female</i>	58.2	48.6	69.0	52.1
Race (%)				
<i>White</i>	74.1	75.6	60.4	73.9
<i>Black</i>	1.2	0.9	2.5	1.0
<i>Mulatto (including mixto-mestizo)</i>	6.8	7.3	9.3	7.5
<i>Asian</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Other</i>	17.9	16.2	27.7	17.6
Annual household income > \$100,000 (%)	46.3	37.0	31.8	39.1
College graduate or above (%)	63.2	45.9	53.8	51.1
Marital status (%)				
<i>Single</i>	37.3	23.2	27.8	27.2
<i>Married</i>	44.3	50.0	37.7	47.9
<i>Divorced</i>	11.6	16.3	17.6	14.8
<i>Widowed</i>	4.3	8.6	15.4	8.1
<i>Other</i>	2.5	1.8	1.5	1.9
Cuban spouse, if married (%)	60.5	79.7	83.7	76.1

Appendix 4b: Voters Political Profiles by Presidential Candidates

	Harris	Trump	DK	Total
Registered party membership (%)				
<i>Republican</i>	8.6	76.6	16.3	56.1
<i>Independent</i>	31.2	20.6	59.2	26.1
<i>Democratic</i>	60.2	2.8	24.4	17.8
Political orientation (%)				
<i>Liberal</i>	55.7	11.0	34.0	23.5
<i>Neutral</i>	23.6	16.3	23.0	18.8
<i>Conservative</i>	20.6	72.7	42.9	57.7
Approval of current administration's policies (%)				
<i>Cuba</i>	58.6	10.3	26.6	23.4
<i>China</i>	63.2	10.3	21.5	24.6
<i>Russia</i>	66.3	11.0	27.8	25.5
<i>Economy</i>	75.2	8.1	23.6	25.7
<i>Ukraine</i>	72.5	19.1	30.5	33.0
<i>Israel-Palestine issues</i>	44.4	26.7	34.6	31.3
Importance of issues (scale 1-5)				
<i>Health care</i>	4.8	4.5	4.3	4.5
<i>Economy</i>	4.5	4.9	4.7	4.8
<i>Immigration</i>	4.0	4.6	4.4	4.5
<i>Cuba policies</i>	3.5	4.0	3.3	3.9
<i>China policies</i>	3.7	4.1	3.8	4.0
<i>Russia policies</i>	3.8	4.1	4.0	4.0
<i>Race relations</i>	4.2	3.4	3.7	3.6
<i>Gun control</i>	4.4	3.3	3.7	3.6
<i>Abortion rights</i>	4.7	3.3	3.8	3.7

Appendix 4c: Voters on Cuba by Presidential Candidates

	Harris	Trump	DK	Total
Policy endorsement (%)				
<i>Continuation of the embargo</i>	30.3	69.3	26.2	57.0
<i>Selling medicine to Cuba</i>	80.7	61.0	77.0	67.0
<i>Selling food to Cuba</i>	78.1	50.0	73.1	58.8
<i>Unrestricted travel to Cuba</i>	66.6	32.9	66.7	43.9
<i>Maintaining diplomatic relations</i>	81.9	35.3	57.8	47.8
<i>Investing in small businesses in Cuba</i>	53.7	23.0	32.6	31.4
<i>Cubans opening bank accounts in U.S.</i>	60.3	27.9	41.7	36.6
<i>Republican candidates who assist private businesses in Cuba</i>	30.3	53.2	35.2	46.8
<i>Democratic candidates who assist private businesses in Cuba</i>	64.1	20.4	31.7	32.0
<i>Maximum pressure on Cuban government to promote regime change</i>	76.0	43.6	61.1	53.0
<i>Policies improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people</i>	68.1	74.9	72.5	73.4
<i>2023 Humanitarian Parole Program</i>	89.7	63.4	75.8	70.8
<i>Listing Cuba with Iran, Sudan and Syria as State Sponsors of Terrorism</i>	45.1	80.2	57.1	69.6
<i>Allowing Cuban baseball players to play professionally in U.S.</i>	74.5	40.6	57.7	50.7
Ties with Cuba (%)				
<i>Sent food and other items to Cuba</i>	40.6	34.4	40.4	36.3
<i>Sent money to Cuba</i>	40.7	37.8	57.5	39.7
<i>Have not traveled to Cuba</i>	53.6	48.3	31.8	48.4
<i>Have relative in Cuba</i>	54.8	65.3	83.0	63.7
<i>Would like to bring relatives to U.S.</i>	54.4	47.4	38.7	48.3
<i>Primary reason to migrate is political freedom</i>	41.7	56.9	36.7	52.1
<i>Likely to go back if economy improves</i>	15.2	7.5	0.7	9.1
<i>Likely to go back if politics changes</i>	23.5	21.9	10.6	22.1
News consumption (%)				
<i>Prefer Spanish language for news of Cuba</i>	19.1	31.2	40.0	28.7
<i>Chief source of Cuba news is traditional media (i.e., newspapers, TV, radio)</i>	42.1	33.2	40.8	35.3
<i>Receive information from social media influencers</i>	36.2	47.5	29.5	44.2
<i>Strong/some influences, if exposed to social media influencers</i>	21.5	38.0	38.6	34.0